



SENDIRÁÐ ÍSLANDS Í STOKKHÓLMI

Kommendörsgatan 35, S-114 58 Stokkhólmi

Sími: 08 442 8300, bréfsími: 660 7423

icemb.stock@utn.stjr.is

*Embættiserindi*Viðtakandi: **Utanríkisráðuneytið**Berist til : **Stefán Skjaldarson**Dags : **18. mars 2003**Tilvísun: **WAS02090019/08.D.611**Efni: **Viðbrögð sænsku ríkisstjórnarinnar við ræðu Bush Bandaríkjaforseta**

Göran Persson harmar þá ákvörðun Bush forseta að ráðist verði inn í Írak. Þetta hefur komið fram í fréttapáttum beggja sjónvarpsstöðvanna í morgun auk viðtal við hann í sænskum dagblöðum í dag. Það er leitt, segir forsætisráðherrann, að Bandaríkin skuli yfirgefa Sameinuðu þjóðirnar og rétt þeirra til þess að taka ákvarðanir. Hann hafnar semsé hernaðaraðgerðum gegn Írak á þessu stigi og það gerir utanríkisráðherrann Anna Lindh líka. Forsætisráðherrann útilokar hins vegar ekki hernaðaraðgerðir og útilokar ekki að styðja þær þegar eftirlitsmennirnir hafa fengið nægan tíma og þegar Sameinuðu þjóðirnar taka ákvörðun um slíkt. -

En hann segir líka: "Við teljum að ákvarðanir EIGI AÐ TAKA Á VETTvangi SAMEINUÐU ÞJÓÐANNA. BANDARÍKIN ERU AÐ BRJÓTA GEGN ÞJÓÐARÉTTI MEÐ ÁKVÖRÐUN SINNI UM INNrás í ÍRAK. ÞAÐ ER EKKI VERJANDI AÐ EFNA TIL ÁRÁSAR ÞEGAR FYRIR LIGGUR AÐ ÞAÐ HEFÐI AÐEINS ÞURFT EINHVERJA MÁNUÐI TIL ÞESS AÐ LJÚKA STARFI EFTIRLITSMANNANNA SEGIR. ÞAÐ SKAÐAR SAMEINUÐU ÞJÓÐIRNAR OG ÞAÐ SKAÐAR ÞJÓÐARRÉTTINN. "

- Við getum alls ekki stutt innás við þessar aðstæður, segir Anna Lindh. Eftir þetta verðum við að verja kröftum til þes að styrkja Sameinuðu þjóðirnar, segir hún líka. Hún telur að klofningurinn innan ESB muni ekki hafa áhrif á starf sambandsins á öðrum sviðum. Þegar kemur að enduruppbyggingu í Írak munum við að sjálfsögðu leggja lið, segir utanríkisráðherrann enn fremur.

F.h.s.

Svavar Gestsson

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23. apríl 2003

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Nafn
Heimilisfang (1)
Heimilisfang (2)
Póstnúmer 101
Póststaður REYKJAVÍK
Land
Símanúmer +354 545 8400
Bréfasími +354 562 4014
Kennitala
Skráð

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
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www.raduneyti.is




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Fréttastofum fjölmiðla hafa verið veittar svofelldar upplýsingar um dagskrá ríkisstjórnarinnar í dag:

Utanríkisráðherra
Ófriðarhorfur

Menntamálaráðherra
Samkomulag um byggingu menningarhúss í Vestmannaeyjum



Íraksmálið
staðan 18. mars 2003

Fulltrúi sendiráðs BNA kom á fund skrifstofustjóra alþjóðaskrifstofu í dag og afhenti lista yfir þau ríki sem styðja aðgerðir BNA og Bretlands gegn Írak (sbr. samtal skrifstofustjóra við ráðherra í gærkvöldi vegna beiðni Heather Conley í Washington). Listinn hafði verið afhentur forsætisráðuneyti í morgun og fulltrúi forsætisráðherra segist hafa borið hann undir utanríkisráðherra. Samkvæmt því hafi verið samþykkt að Ísland bættist í hóp þeirra 23 ríkja sem þegar voru á listanum.

Listinn (sjá hjálagt) er algjört trúnaðarmál, en athygli vekur að á hann vantar dygga stuðningsmenn BNA í málinu hingað til t.d. Ástralí, Japaní og Portúgali. Sagðist sendiráð BNA láta vita hvort ríki bættust á listann og með hvaða hætti ætlunin væri að nota hann. Þá var og rætt hvað það þýddi fyrir ríki að vera á listanum, og fulltrúa sendiráðsins gert ljóst að hér væri um pólitískan stuðning að ræða eingöngu. Ísland sem herlaust ríki gæti ekki stutt hernaðaraðgerðir.

Síðar í dag kom í ljós að Ástralir og Pólverjar ætla að senda lið til Persaflóa. Þá hefur forsætisráðherra Japans sagst styðja kröfu Bush um lokafrest Saddam Hussein til handa.

Saddam Hussein hefur þegar sagt að hann muni hvergi víkja og sé ekki á leið í útleið ásamt sonum sínum eins og Bush krafðist í nótt (innan 48 stunda).

Lögmæti aðgerða umdeilt. Rök stuðningsríkja aðgerða:

Íraksstjórn hefur meira eða minna brotið gegn öllum ályktunum öryggisráðs Sp frá því að vopnahlésályktun öryggisráðs Sp nr.687 var samþykkt í öryggisráðinu 3. apríl 1991. Vopnahlésskilmálarnir lögðu þá skyldu á hendur Írak að útrýma öllum gereyðingarvopnum sínum undir alþjóðlegu eftirliti. Þessi skilmálar hafa allir verið þverbrotnir. Hinn lagalegi grundvöllur byggir aðallega á eftirfarandi ályktunum öryggisráðsins, þ.e. 678, 687 og 1441. Kjarni þessara þriggja ályktanna er:

- hald Íraka á gereyðingarvopnum er ógn við alþjóðlegan frið og öryggi.
- Írak hefur ekki afvopnast
- Írak hefur brotið gegn ákvæðum vopnahlésskilmálanna frá 1991

Ályktun 1441 frá 8. nóvember 2002 hnykkir á meginkröfum allra fyrri ályktana varðandi afvopnun Íraks. Í ljósi þessa hníga viss þjóðréttarleg rök í þá veru að réttlæta megi hernaðaraðgerðir gegn Írak til að neyða Íraka til að afvopnast. En hins vegar má segja að afdráttarlaus ályktun öryggisráðs Sp sem heimili hernaðaraðgerðir liggi ekki fyrir, sem hefði verið betri kostur. En úr því sem komið er geta menn vísað í fyrirliggjandi ályktanir.

Frakkar hafa óskað eftir fundi utanríkisráðherra í öryggisráðinu 19. mars. Talið er víst að Ivanov, Fischer og Villepin mæti. Powell hefur sagt að hann telji enga ástæðu til þess að mæta. Sumir telja þó að hann gæti orðið að gera það.

Athyglisvert verður að fylgjast með því hvaða ríki munu þegar á hólminn er komið verða boðið að taka þátt í uppbyggingarstarfinu. Ekki er líklegt að leitað verði til Frakka úr því sem komið er. Í Þýskalandi telja sumir að að Þjóðverjum verði ekki boðið að taka þátt í mannúðar- og uppbyggingarstarfi því sem fylgja mun í kjölfar átaka, sem væri Þjóðverjum mikið áfall.

Hjálögð er ræða Blair. Blair þótti takast einstaklega vel upp í dag og færa sannfærandi rök fyrir nauðsyn á aðgerðum gegn Írak. Bush í ræðu sinni í nótt, eins og þegar hafði verið búist við, gaf Saddam Hussein 48 tíma lokafrest til að hypja sig úr landi. Hann talaði til írösku þjóðarinnar, hvatti hana til að snúast gegn Saddam Hussein og hermenn til að leggja niður vopn. Þá hét Bush þeim mannúðaradoð á meðan á átökum stæði og í kjölfar þeirra.

Þá fylgja og viðbótarupplýsingar sendiráða um afstöðu ríkja til aðgerða án nýrrar ályktunar öryggisráðs Sp (hluti upplýsinga sendiráða hafa þegar verið afhentar ráðherra). Einnig er hjálögð afsagnarræða Robins Cook.

ATHUGA AÐ LOKUM: Ný þróun innan Sp. Boðaður hefur verið fundur í hópi NAM í dag kl. 17, til að ræða kröfu um að efnt verði til neyðarfundar í allsherjarþinginu um Írak. Ef helmingur aðildarríkja krefst þess, ber að halda slíkan fund innan sólarhrings. Því er hugsanlegt að fundað yrði í allsherjarþinginu n.k. fimmtudag. Fastanefnd mun greina frá framþróun þessa máls eftir því sem upplýsingar liggja fyrir. Að mati alþjóðaskrifstofu ætti Ísland ekki að styðja málsupptöku í allsherjarþingi. Málið er enn til umfjöllunar í öryggisráðinu. Auk þess sem umfjöllun í allsherjarþinginu yrði aðeins til þess að undirstrika enn frekar ágreining aðildarríkja Sp.

SITUATION IN IRAQ

Declaration by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic
Elysée Palace, March 18, 2003

Ever since the beginning of the Iraq crisis, France has endeavoured to make possible the necessary disarmament of Iraq under United Nations authority. This disarmament is under way, as the inspectors have been demonstrating. France has acted in the name of the primacy of the law and in accordance with her conception of relations between peoples and between nations.

True to the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which is our common law, France considers that recourse to force is the last resort, when all other options have been exhausted.

France's position is shared by the great majority of the international community. The most recent debates have clearly shown that the Security Council was not prepared, under present circumstances, to approve a precipitate march to war.

The United States has just issued an ultimatum to Iraq. Whether, I repeat, it's a matter of the necessary disarmament of Iraq or of the desirable change of regime in that country, there no justification for a unilateral decision to resort to war.

Regardless of the forthcoming developments, this ultimatum is calling into question our idea of international relations. It affects the future of a people, the future of a region, world stability.

It is a grave decision, at a time when Iraq's disarmament is under way and the inspections have proved to be a credible alternative method of disarming that country. It is also a decision which jeopardizes future use of methods to resolve peacefully crises linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq does not today present an immediate threat warranting an immediate war. France appeals to everyone to act responsibly to ensure the respect of international legality. It appeals to them to maintain the Security Council's unity by staying within the framework set by UNSCR 1441.

To act outside the authority of the United Nations, to prefer the use of force to compliance with the law, would incur a heavy responsibility./.



LOUIS BARDOLLET
AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE
EN ISLANDE

*For your information.
Sincerely yours.*

TUNGATA 22,
P.O. BOX 1750
121 REYKJAVÍK

TEL: (354) 551-7621/22
PAX: (354) 562-8177
E-MAIL: amb.fran@itn.is

UTN 0208 0276	
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SITUATION IN IRAQ

**Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the French Republic
Elysée Palace, March 18, 2003**

An ultimatum has just been issued to Iraq, without consultation of the United Nations Security Council. This unilateral decision goes against the will of the Security Council and the international community, which desire to pursue Iraq's disarmament in accordance with UNSCR 1441.

Regardless of the goal pursued, France reiterates that the Security Council alone is authorized to legitimize the use of force.

France appeals to everyone to act responsibly to ensure respect for international legality. To act outside the authority of the United Nations, to prefer the use of force to compliance with the law, would incur a heavy responsibility./.

SITUATION IN IRAQ

Address by Dominique de Villepin, French Foreign Minister, before the United Nations Security Council.
New York, March 19, 2003

Mr. President,
Mr. Secretary-General,
Ministers,
Ambassadors,

We are meeting here today a few hours before the weapons sound. To exchange our convictions again in observance of our respective commitments. But also to outline together the paths that must allow us to recover the spirit of unity.

I wish to reiterate here that for France war can only be the exception, and collective responsibility the rule. Whatever our aversion for Saddam Hussein's cruel regime, that holds true for Iraq and for all the crises that we will have to confront together.

* * *

1 – To Mr. Blix, who presented his work program to us, and Mr. ElBaradei, who was represented today, I want to say thank you for the sustained efforts and results achieved. Their program is a reminder that there is still a clear and credible prospect for disarming Iraq peacefully. It proposes and prioritizes the tasks for such disarmament and presents a realistic timetable for their implementation.

In doing so the report confirms what we all know here: Yes, the inspections are producing tangible results. Yes, they offer the prospect of effective disarmament through peaceful means and in shorter time-frames.

The path we mapped out together in the context of resolution 1441 still exists. In spite of the fact that it has been interrupted today, we know that it will have to resume as soon as possible.

The Council took note two days ago of the Secretary-General's decision to withdraw the inspectors and all UN personnel from Iraq. The discharge of their mandates has consequently been suspended. It will be necessary when the time comes to complete our knowledge about Iraq's programs and finish disarming Iraq. The contribution of the inspectors will be decisive at that time.

2 – Make no mistake about it: the choice is indeed between two visions of the world.

To those who choose to use force and think they can resolve the world's complexity through swift and preventive action, we offer in contrast determined action over time. For today, to ensure our security, all the dimensions of the problem must be taken into account: both the manifold crises and their many facets, including cultural and religious. Nothing lasting in international relations can be built therefore without dialogue and respect for the other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example. To ignore this is to run the risk of misunderstanding, radicalization and spiraling violence. This is even more true in the Middle East, an area of fractures and ancient conflicts where stability must be a major objective for us.

To those who hope to eliminate the dangers of proliferation through armed intervention in Iraq, I wish to say that we regret that they are depriving themselves of a key tool for other crises of the same type. The Iraq crisis allowed us craft an instrument, through the

inspections regime, which is unprecedented and can serve as an example. Why, on this basis not envision establishing an innovative, permanent structure, a disarmament body under the United Nations?

To those who think that the scourge of terrorism will be eradicated through the case of Iraq, we say they run the risk of failing in their objectives. The outbreak of force in this area which is so unstable can only exacerbate the tensions and fractures on which the terrorists feed.

3 – Over and above our division, we have a collective responsibility in the face of these threats, the responsibility to recover the unity of the international community. The United Nations must remain mobilized in Iraq to aid this objective. Together, we have duties to assume in this perspective.

- First of all, to staunch the wounds of war. As always, war brings with it its share of victims, suffering and displaced people. So it is a matter of urgency to prepare now to provide the requisite humanitarian assistance. This imperative must prevail over our differences. The Secretary-General has already begun to mobilize the various UN agencies to this end. France will take its full part in the collective effort to assist the Iraqi people. The oil-for-food program must be continued under the authority of the Security Council with the necessary adjustments. We are waiting for the Secretary-General's proposals.

- Next, it is necessary to build peace. No country by itself has the means to build Iraq's future. In particular, no state can claim the necessary legitimacy. It is from the United Nations alone that the legal and moral authority can come for such an undertaking. Two principles must guide our action: respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; and the preservation of its sovereignty.

- By the same token, it is for the United Nations to set out the framework for the country's economic reconstruction. A framework that will have to affirm the two complementary principles of transparency and development of the country's resources for the benefit of the Iraqis themselves.

4 – Our mobilization must also extend to the other threats that we have to address together.

Given the very nature of these threats, it is no longer possible today to address them in any old order. By way of example, terrorism is fueled by organized crime networks; it cleaves to the contours of lawless areas; it thrives on regional crises; it garners support from the divisions in the world; it utilizes all available resources, from the most rudimentary to the most sophisticated, from the knife to the weapons of mass destruction it is trying to acquire.

To deal with this reality, we must act in a united way and on all fronts at the same time.

5 – So we must remain constantly mobilized.

In this spirit France renews its call for the heads of state and government to meet here in the Security Council to respond to the major challenges confronting us.

Let us intensify our fight against terrorism. Let us fight mercilessly against its networks with all the economic, juridical and political weapons available to us.

Let us give new impetus to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. France has already proposed that our heads of state and government meet on the sidelines of the next General Assembly to define together the new priorities for our action.

Let us recover the initiative in the regional conflicts that are destabilizing entire regions. I am thinking in particular of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. How much suffering must the peoples

of the region still endure for us to force the doors to peace? Let us not resign ourselves to the irreparable.

In a world where the threat is asymmetrical, where the weak defy the strong, the power of conviction, the capacity to convince, the ability to sway opinion count as much as the number of divisions. They do not replace them. But they are the indispensable aids of a state's influence.

6 – Faced with this new world, it is imperative that the action of the international community should be guided by principles.

First of all, respect for law. The keystone of international order, it must apply in all circumstances, but even more so when the gravest decision is to be made: to use force. Only on this condition can force be legitimate. Only on this condition can it restore order and peace.

Next, the defense of freedom and justice. We must not compromise with what is central to our values. We will be listened to and heeded only if we are inspired by the very ideals of the United Nations.

Lastly, the spirit of dialogue and tolerance. Never have the peoples of the world aspired so forcefully to its respect. We must listen to their appeal.

* * *

As we see clearly, the United Nations has never been so necessary. It is up to this body to harness all the resolve to meet these challenges. Because the United Nations is the place where international rules and legitimacy are founded. Because it speaks in the name of peoples.

In response to the clash of arms there must be a single upwelling of the spirit of responsibility, voice and gesture from the international community that is gathered here in New York, in the Security Council.

This is in the interest of all: the countries engaged in the conflict, the states and peoples in the region, the international community as a whole. Confronted with a world in crisis, we have a moral and political obligation to restore the threads of hope and unity.

The judgment of future generations will depend on our capacity to meet this great challenge—in furtherance of our values, our common destiny and peace.


Thank you./.

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☐ Previous
 ☐ Next
 ☐ Index

STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING


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STATE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: RICHARD BOUCHER, DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN

STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING ROOM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1:04 P.M. EST, TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 2003

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MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

All right. I don't have any statements or announcements. I'd be glad to take your questions. Mr. Schweid?

Q Could you, in any way you can, describe the functions of the 30 countries listed as part of the coalition? The first question, of course, would be, are more than a handful contributing troops? And - well, let's begin with that.

MR. BOUCHER: There are 30 countries who have agreed to be part of the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq. I'd have to say these are countries that we have gone to and said, "Do you want to be listed?" and they've said yes.

I'll read them to you alphabetically so that we get the definitive list out on the record. They are Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. Each country's contributing in the way that it deems the most appropriate. Some of these countries -- I suppose all these countries have talked in public about what they're doing.

In addition to these countries, there are actually another 15 or so that we know of, probably more than 15, that are cooperating with us in -- and the coalition or perhaps offering defensive assets in the event that Saddam resorts to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Some of these people are what you might call "boots on the ground," in terms of providing military support or deploying defensive military units, like, for example, nuclear, biological and chemical specialists to be available for defense of areas if the Iraqi regime should use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

There are other countries who may be providing access, basing or overflight rights. Still others have committed themselves to post- conflict peacekeeping and reconstruction. And you have some -- for example, Japan was very clearly not in the former category but in the latter.

I think all these countries, one way or the other, and some others have talked about what they're doing.

Q Well, in the list -- excuse me. But there's a footnote next to Japan specifying that their cooperation or the support is postwar.

MR. BOUCHER: I think this has got to be the list, the way I just discussed it.

But --

Q No, no, no. I hear you.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

Q But what we -- I understand that Japan is postwar. Let me put it that way.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

Q Are there others among the 30 who are simply part of a postwar reconstruction effort?

MR. BOUCHER: Many of these people are associated somehow militarily, with the action. I think most -- "almost all" is probably a better description. Some of them, like Japan, are probably exclusively interested in the post-conflict situation and helping out, if we get to that.

But I think most of these others, if you look at what they themselves have said, are in some ways willing or participating in or supporting potential conflict, if that's where it ends up.

Q Richard, on the --

MR. BOUCHER: And I'd have to say some of the other 15, who have not listed themselves as part of the coalition, are in fact participating in defensive measures or other things, but just don't feel they want be publicly listed at this point. So this is a -- I've got to say this is a changing list and changing numbers.

Q Okay. So I think that might answer my question. Are you saying that your coalition of the willing and coalition of the unwilling to be named is expandable? You're still out there recruiting?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, it is.

Q Okay.

MR. BOUCHER: There are people who may want to be named in the future, and there are, I'm sure, people who will be participating in other things if we have to go forward.

Q And two, I know you don't want to get into specifics of what each country would offer, but at least two countries on this list kind of jump out at me in terms of what their ability is to do anything, and that would be Afghanistan and Ethiopia. I understand that Afghanistan might be overflight rights. But what kind of thing would -- and not to denigrate the Ethiopians, but what kind of thing would --

Q Eritrea.

Q -- Eritrea -- well, what kind of things are these countries, which, you know, do not have great amounts of resources and are not really --

MR. BOUCHER: They may not be deploying. They may not be providing a specific resource. But they may just be allowing access, overflight or other participation in that way, or they may just have decided they want to be publicly associated with the effort to disarm Iraq. Remember, that's the fundamental of this -- that these are countries who have all stood up and said it's time to disarm Iraq, and if Iraq doesn't do that peacefully, we need to be prepared to do it by whatever means are necessary -- people that are associating themselves in public with the effort to make sure that Iraq is disarmed, and disarmed soon.

Q Richard --

MR. BOUCHER: Let's go there and then --

Q In terms of the size of this coalition compared with others that you've created and -- to do with international goals, how big is this? I've heard it's the third-largest or something.

MR. BOUCHER: I don't quite want to do that yet, because of the question that Barry asked, because I want to make sure, before I start saying -- I think the generally held number for the Persian Gulf War was 31. But I do -- I want to check that.

I'm not sure that we have the same standards for inclusion. This is a list of countries, 30 countries, that want to be publicly associated with the idea that Iraq needs to be disarmed now. They're all participating, contributing in some way, or interested in participating in some way. I suspect the numbers don't quite compare yet. And so I'm going to be very careful about not making that comparison yet.

Q Richard, the standard -- it's a very diverse, eclectic list. And obviously the standard for inclusion is very low. Does this mean that -- well, agreeing to be listed --

MR. BOUCHER: I would point out --

Q Does that mean that you --

MR. BOUCHER: -- it's probably higher than the standard for inclusion in the room here. But anyway --

Q O-o-o-o! No! (Laughter.)

Q Did -- I assume that you asked everybody in the world whether they were willing to go on this list, and therefore you had a 160 rejections or so?

MR. BOUCHER: No.

Q How -- who -- how many did you ask, then?

MR. BOUCHER: We asked a number of countries that we knew were involved or potentially involved. I don't have the exact number, but I think the fact that you have this many countries that want to stand up and associate themselves with the effort at this point and that, as you know, there are others who are taking steps and doing real things to contribute to the effort to disarm Iraq is significant.

Q If any country in the world said "We want to be listed," you would not turn them down for any

reason.

MR. BOUCHER: I suppose we would at least -- we would want to see that there was something on their part that merited inclusion. I think all these countries have something that merits inclusion.

Q Wait a minute. Let's get it straight. You said the -- some of them only -- were only listed because they wanted to be associated publicly with this --

MR. BOUCHER: And had an intention -- were either involved or had an intention of participating in the future.

Q (Off mike) -- Arab countries?

Q (Off mike.)

MR. BOUCHER: I think I said those things, yes.

Q No Arab country --

MR. BOUCHER: Let's -- let's slow down.

Q One big question and one small one. Have France, Germany, Russia or China offered things like overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft? And secondly --

MR. BOUCHER: That's a question you'd have to ask them. As I've set the precedent before, I continue it today, not talking about others' -- contributions by others unless I'm absolutely sure they themselves have talked about it. So you'd have to ask them first.

Q And secondly, what happens with diplomacy now? Are we in the -- beginning to draft resolutions to go back to the Security Council to ask for help with humanitarian aid in post-conflict Iraq, stabilization forces, a U.N. mandate to -- for food distribution, for a host of things?

MR. BOUCHER: It's a very good question. If I can, it's a big question, and I want to answer it fully. So if I can, I'm going to answer his question, and I'll come back to this. He was going to say, "What about the Arab countries?"

Q No Arab country volunteered to be on the list?

MR. BOUCHER: At this point I think the Arab countries have explained their steps at this point in perhaps slightly different ways. I'll leave it at that.

Q What do you mean?

Q They don't want to be named?

MR. BOUCHER: I'll leave it to them to explain exactly what their position is.

All right. Robin's question is an important point, and I think is actually a question that was discussed today at the senior staff meeting.

The secretary told the senior State Department staff today that we're moving into a new phase of diplomacy; that we've been concentrating on the United Nations; we were very successful in getting a critical and very important resolution, 1441, from the United Nations; that we've made every possible effort since then to have the United Nations deal with this issue peacefully -- did not result in a second resolution. But I think at this point, what he said was we need to turn our energies and

our attention to what follows. And that includes several things.

First is working with the countries that are involved in this effort to maintain and support the effort in every way possible. The second point is to start focusing more on the humanitarian situation, if it comes to conflict, and the potential aftermath. And the third is to consider how well we need to do if the military has to do their job in the aftermath of a conflict in order to reestablish things like the oil-for-food program on a new basis.

If you look at the statement that the leaders issued in the Azores, it was quite a, I think, particular explanation of -- said that we would propose that the secretary-general be given authority on an interim basis to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people continue to be met through the oil-for-food program. So we are already in consultations with some other governments about that. We will be talking to other governments about the critical importance of keeping the oil-for-food program running to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. We'll be consulting with the United Nations and other council members on adjustments to the current program that can ensure continued delivery of oil-for-food supplies. A new U.N. Security Council resolution will be necessary to ensure that foodstuffs and medical goods are available for the needs of Iraqi civilians. In a conflict environment and then a post-conflict environment, we are looking also at the various options with regard to program administration and operations, including alternate means for delivery and distribution.

We have been in touch with others who are interested in the humanitarian situation, such as the European Union, such as the United Nations organizations, such as individual governments like Japan, who are interested in the humanitarian situation and then in the aftermath, the questions of rehabilitation, reconstruction, helping the Iraqis put things back together after so many, many years of tyranny in this rule.

So we are -- I would say we have been working on many of these things. That is the focus of diplomacy at this point now.

Q Richard, following up on the -- (word inaudible) -- of diplomacy, the French ambassador to the U.S. today said that even despite everything that's gone on at the U.N., that in the event that Saddam Hussein uses biological and chemical weapons against coalition forces, that this would change the equation entirely for the French government and suggested that perhaps France could even take part in a military action; also talked about working on post-Saddam Iraq issues with the U.S. Do you see that despite everything that's gone on at the U.N., that France can play a valuable role and that the relationship can get back on track shortly?

MR. BOUCHER: I would quote what I've heard the secretary say on the subject, that there's going to be more than enough work for everybody. There's a lot to do, whether it's in a conflict situation, and particularly if Iraq were to use weapons of mass destruction; and there's a lot to do after a conflict to make sure the Iraqi people are given a chance to reestablish themselves in the world and to run their own affairs. So we have said that we welcome contributions from other governments who might be willing to participate in those efforts. And we would be willing to work with them in that regard. As far as exactly what France may be planning, I think I'll leave you with the statement of the French ambassador.

Q But in terms of, you know, the kind of criticism, public criticism on both sides over the last week or so, do you see that the two countries will be able to work closely together and that any kind of resentment about what's gone on in the past will be put aside in the interests of --

MR. BOUCHER: As with any ally, we always have agreements and disagreements. We can be cooperating in several areas at once and disagreeing rather noisily about something else somewhere else. This has been a very important issue for the United States. We think it's a very important issue for the international community, for the credibility of the U.N. Security Council and for the

credibility of the members of that council. So I think the French veto -- whatever happens -- threat will remain in our minds and certainly becomes part of the picture that we have to take into account whenever we consider issues. So there was a serious disagreement on this matter, and I think it showed that in -- the U.N. Security Council's lost relevancy on this particular issue, but that doesn't mean that we won't be able to cooperate with the French and others in other ways in other times, and even on this issue as it proceeds.

Okay, start heading back.

Q Yesterday Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien said Canada would not be involved in a military coalition. So I just wanted to find out if it was a disappointment to have a close ally and neighbor not choose to be involved.

Q Could you throw in Mexico in that answer?

MR. BOUCHER: (Laughs.) Well, the answer is yes, but -- (looking through briefing materials).

Q Yes what, you're disappointed?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. But I won't tell you that until I can find the right page.

There's the right page! Oh, I made a mistake. I'm sorry. I won't tell you what --

Q I know what it was. (Soft laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER: I was looking in the wrong continent. The --

Q (Off mike) -- to lose tracks --

Q (Laughs.)

MR. BOUCHER: It's only been a year and a half or two years since we moved it.

Disarming Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction is vital to the security of the world community. Saddam Hussein has refused to disarm, and as Resolution 1441 authorizes, we're preparing to remove those weapons of mass destruction by force.

We're disappointed that some of our closest allies, including Canada, do not agree on the urgent need for action. We're grateful that Canada remains a critical partner in the global war on terrorism. Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and military personnel participating in the anti-terrorist operations in the Persian Gulf regions, we understand, will continue their deployments, and we continue to cooperate closely with the Canadian government and Canadian law enforcement in protecting our common border.

As far as Mexico goes, the same thing. We're disappointed they don't share our urgent sense that the world community needs to quickly and decisively counter the threat that Iraq represents. At the same time, we value our relationship with Mexico, and we'll continue to cooperate closely with the Mexican government on a full range of bilateral issues, including implementation our 22-point border action plan.

So for example, when we raise the terrorist threat alert in the United States, we coordinate closely with our neighboring countries.

Nan?

Q I have a follow-up on Canada. What will be the consequences on the bilateral issues, trade? Will there be any effect because of Canada's position?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know how to predict any particular effect. Whether it changes attitudes, the one to the other, I don't know. But I think we do remember, certainly, the broad extent of our cooperation, the importance of our cooperation with Canada, bilaterally and also in the war against terrorism.

Q Richard, aside from humanitarian work in a post-Saddam Iraq, I assume that things like -- although I guess this could be a humanitarian issue -- that Saddam and his top generals and his sons could be brought up for war crimes or crimes against humanity. Is that included in your --

MR. BOUCHER: It's an issue that will have to be addressed at the appropriate time. It's a matter that -- certainly we're all aware of the extensive crimes of this regime; that Saddam, his family and his top leaders have committed massive crimes against the Iraqi people, against neighbors, against Kuwait while they were occupying Kuwait. And so there are many things that will need to be dealt with.

At the same time, they need to be dealt with both in terms of what the Iraqi people want and in terms of what the international community wants. And so, as you've seen in other situations, you can't give a definitive answer as to how that will happen until the situation is resolved.

Q Could you say why Saddam's sons are included on this list?

MR. BOUCHER: Because they've been an integral part of this regime and have personally been involved in -- you know, one's the head of the special security organization. I forget exactly what the other is. But they've been among the top leaders of this regime and personally and heavily involved in the kind of actions, horrible actions that this regime has taken both internally and with regard to its neighbors.

Q Can we go back just for a second about the U.N. Security Council resolution you're going to be seeking on the oil-for-food program? Is there anything you can tell us about what kind of changes you want to see, or any more detail, other than the fact that you want to see it changed --

MR. BOUCHER: We are consulting with others at this point. The way the program works now would need to be adjusted somewhat in the post-conflict environment without the current government in place. And one would be able to make sure -- I mean, we've emphasized the fact that there are some 55,000 distribution centers inside Iraq. Not only are we planning in advance for getting humanitarian supplies into that system, but we need to also -- we are also consulting with others now so that the sort of sustaining power of the oil-for-food program can be brought to ensure that those distribution centers continue to provide to the Iraqi people what they need for as long as they need it.

Q I guess, are you -- is one of the changes that you're seeking to make is because there won't necessarily be a formal Iraqi government on the day after, and you want to make sure that they get access to humanitarian goods; that the U.S. or some other group of people would have the authority to then distribute these much needed --

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I'm not going to go into too much detail at this point. We're just starting to consult with some other governments about this to try to understand at what moment and what time we can make this change in the program. The initial stockpiling that we've done, and I think some of the U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations have done, is to ensure that in the immediate aftermath that Iraqi people don't suffer from lack of food and other supplies in whatever transition situation they become involved in.

Q Can we change the subject, or not?

MR. BOUCHER: Okay, Nicholas?

Q Yeah, about tomorrow. I understand the secretary is not going to New York for the council meeting tomorrow.

MR. BOUCHER: No plans to go to New York, no.

Q Sorry.

MR. BOUCHER: No plans at all to go to New York.

Q Right. And he also said that Ambassador Negroponte will represent the United States. Do you have any particular objective for that meeting, or are you going just to listen to the other foreign ministers and others countries present?

MR. BOUCHER: We always attend meetings like this, and we will always participate for the United States. I think we have to point out that to have a meeting on key remaining tasks for the inspectors tomorrow, you have to sort of wonder what it's all about. The inspectors are pulling out of Iraq. Dr. Blix himself has said that you can't do the key remaining tasks unless Iraq has cooperated immediately and unconditionally, and it's quite obvious to us and to others that Iraq has not provided that sort of cooperation.

But I'm sure we'll participate and provide our views on the subject at hand.

Q Well, what do you think that the meeting's about?

MR. BOUCHER: I think that's what it's supposed to be about. We'll just see what the discussion leads to, if anything.

Terri?

Q Even with the numbers, as people have pointed out, with 30 namable ones on your side, does it still give you the feeling that things are turning more in the U.S.' favor since until this point, you didn't compile a list; you didn't have even this many countries who were willing to say, "Yes, put us on your list; we're ready to go if it should happen tomorrow"? Does their more open support -- some of these we haven't heard so much about -- does that make it easier for you?

MR. BOUCHER: I think some countries, as you know, have already gone to parliament. I think Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, others have gone to parliament about deploying these nuclear-biological- chemical units. Other countries have taken steps to help Turkey deal with any potentialities that might arise. So, a lot of this has been public.

And, as you know, we've always told you that there were at least two dozen, probably more, countries who were taking steps in this regard. As we get closer to the moment of truth, it's -- people have to make their decisions, they have to go to their parliaments, they have to -- you know, things naturally sort of become more public. But I do think there's a very substantial group of countries that are supporting the need to disarm Iraq at this moment, not just with their rhetoric or by signing up for a list, but also by their concrete actions, whether it's deployments or overflights, basing or starting to get ready for the post-conflict situation.

Betsy?

Q Another question on the humanitarian -- on war crimes. Is the U.S. drawing up a list of charges

against these people to give to whatever entity you may, you know -- (inaudible) -- after the conflict?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. I think the answer in terms of the U.S. is I don't know. There's been information collected for many years inside the U.S. government as well as outside. There's a group in London that I think you know we provide some funding to, that -- INDICT that does -- has been collecting this kind of information. So the information has been collected for many years. Whether we're preparing a list of charges or not, I don't know.

Okay, Elise?

Sorry. Nobody wants to leave the subject, Jonathan.

Q To go back to the Blix meeting tomorrow, two of the countries that did not support the second resolution said that it should be up to Blix to come to the council and say we've reached a dead end, we have nothing more we can operate -- we can't operate this way anymore, and then perhaps they would agree that inspections have run their course. And do you think there's any point in Blix tomorrow coming to the council and saying, this is what has been done, this is what could be done, or whatever? Or do you not trust the inspectors enough to make a recommendation on whether they're effectively doing their job or not?

MR. BOUCHER: There's two elements to that. The first element was firmly, clearly decided to all the parties involved when we dealt with Resolution 1441. Fourteen-forty-one specifically did not say that the inspectors had to come back to the council and say "I can't do this any more." That was raised, that was discussed, and it was decided in 1441 that it would be an objective criteria. Iraq had to fully disclose and Iraq had to cooperate fully and immediately. If Iraq did not fully disclose its programs and it did not cooperate completely and immediately, they would be -- that would constitute a further material breach, engendering the council discussion and serious consequences. It was left as an objective fact, not a burden that would be left on the heads of the inspectors to decide, basically, issues of peace and war. And I think you know our position all along was to say inspectors shouldn't have to do that. Nation- states need to take their responsibility and make those decisions of what to do abo

ut it. The inspectors' job was to go to look in Iraq, to report to us on what kind of cooperation if any they were getting, and report back what they were finding what they were doing.

So that has been our view all along. And we're not trying -- never -- we did not in 1441 impose upon them the burden of saying, "That's it, I can't do it any more." If that came -- if that became the objective fact, that was fine. But they were not called upon to make decisions that nation-states should be making.

As far as planning out the further work plans or trying to endorse further work plans, given the current circumstances, given Iraq's consistent lack of cooperation, refusal to cooperate over the last several months, it's quite clear to us that it doesn't make a lot of sense to talk about future cooperation, future work programs. Dr. Blix himself wrote that the work program was predicated on the assumption that Iraq will provide immediate, unconditional and active cooperation. Iraq has steadfastly refused to provide that kind of cooperation, and I don't see any basis for making the assumption that they will.

Robin?

Q Since diplomacy was involved in organizing the coalition, can you tell us how many of the countries you listed are providing troops for offensive encounters? And if you can't tell us which ones, can you tell us if there's anyone besides Britain that is going to provide fighting forces?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I am not going to speak for other governments.

I do know that United States, Britain, Australia have both -- all spoken about this in public. Whether others have, I just don't know. But I'm not here speaking for any other government and I'm not here to disclose facts that others have --

Q Are there any beyond those three?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, you know, are there any beyond these 45 that are contributing in some way? I mean, there are very significant contributions from all these countries in terms of what they're doing. Every partner in this effort is valued.

Q But is there any country, without naming it, that is prepared to provide fighting forces?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, you want to slice this and dice this 12 ways so you can say it's small numbers. If three, four, five, six are doing this, 12 are doing that, 13 are doing that, and only eight are doing that, it still adds up to a significant number of countries that have spoken out. And so I leave it to each country to explain, but the fact is that each country's deciding how to contribute as appropriate to this. In some ways, it may be offensive forces, some ways it may be defense, some ways --for some countries it may be helping an ally protect itself, some places it may be post-conflict scenarios. But each country has to decide how to commit itself, how to participate.

Q Can I just ask one last follow-up?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

Q Can you confirm that Denmark and Poland are willing to provide fighting forces?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not speaking for any other government. You can go ahead and check. I know that the Poles have talked publicly somewhat, have talked publicly about, I think, the nuclear/biological/chemical units. But you can ask them if those are defensive, offensive or however they want to describe them.

Yeah?

Q How close is Turkey from allowing positioning of U.S. troops on its soil?

MR. BOUCHER: The Turkish parliament -- the cabinet, I think, is still meeting at this point. The secretary, as you know, talked to now Foreign Minister Gul last night, would expect to speak to him again after the cabinet meeting is over. The United States has made a series of requests of the Turkish government, as you all know, over time. And overflights is a priority for us, but all the requests are pending. We will hope that we'll be able to have Turkey's support in the days ahead. We're in close consultations with them. And we'll await the outcome of the cabinet's decisions.

Q I understand that you're not going to speak for the governments, but you can speak for what was asked of the countries.

MR. BOUCHER: No, I can't do that either.

Q Specifically Italy.

MR. BOUCHER: I can't do that, either. Thank you. Sorry.

Q (Off mike) -- because I was a little confused after the -- what the secretary said. The status of the six billion, that package itself as a \$6 billion package is off the table. I understand that. But something smaller than that, or something -- something somehow similar but different in some ways

is still on the table, or could be on the table if they participated, or if they -- or if they get involved?
Is that --

MR. BOUCHER: (Laughs.) I -- we'll be glad to release the exact transcript of what the secretary said, and I'll leave you with those words. I think he explained it, I think quite clearly. And I'm not going to try to revise and extend his remarks.

Okay, Jonathan, we get to change the subject?

Q Yeah. The British today have the impression that the road map might be released today. Is that a possibility? And if not, have the conditions for the release of the road map been met?

MR. BOUCHER: The president the other night said that the road map would be released immediately upon confirmation of the new government for the Palestinians. I think the Palestinian legislature has taken an important and -- an important step in moving forward by confirming the office and the duties of the office -- created the position of an empowered prime minister. That's a positive, an important step forward. This is a significant shift in the authorities to the prime minister regarding important issues like public order and security, oversight of public institutions, cabinet, et cetera. So at this point we are looking for a condition that the president talked about. The president said immediately upon confirmation of the Palestinian prime minister a road map will be given to the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Q Can I just follow up on that? So what -- confirmation means -- means what exactly in this context?

MR. BOUCHER: Confirming the new government.

Q You mean by parliament.

MR. BOUCHER: By the -- by the legislature, yeah.

Q But the -- but as far as you're concerned, the legislation setting the powers and authorities is sufficient to meet your conditions.

MR. BOUCHER: (Pause.) The legislation is important. It's not all -- I don't know exactly what you mean by "to meet your conditions". For release of the road map, or --

Q (Off mike) -- the condition of real authority.

MR. BOUCHER: Empowerment.

Q Empowerment, right.

MR. BOUCHER: We think the legislation provides significant empowerment, as we've discussed here several -- several -- many times, that we think full empowerment is important. And we'll just see how this -- how the authorities can be exercised.

Q I'm -- I'm sorry, you haven't really answered the question at all.

MR. BOUCHER: I thought I answered it about three times, but I'll try again.

Q No, no, you haven't at all. You haven't --

MR. BOUCHER: Well --

Q You've completely avoided the question. The question is very simple. Is --

MR. BOUCHER: When are we going to release it? Immediately upon confirmation of the government.

Q No, is --

MR. BOUCHER: Is that the question?

Q Under the present -- under the existing legislation?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, the legislation that was confirmed --

Q (Off mike.)

MR. BOUCHER: -- the legislation that was provided is, I said, a positive step. And now next step, I think, is for the government to be named, for the prime minister to be given authority to choose a government, and then for the government to be confirmed. And then we release the road map.

Q You said two different things here.

Q (Off mike) -- is it just for the prime minister to be confirmed, or is it for him to name a government? And with what you gave to the Israelis, like --

MR. BOUCHER: It's my understanding, in most parliamentary systems, the prime minister and his government are confirmed together.

Q So there isn't -- you're not intending to take -- to step back a little bit from what the president said the other night, when he said --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sticking right with the president, hundred percent.

Q Well, okay. But you -- he's saying -- you quoted from him accurately, "immediately on the confirmation of the prime minister," and then you seemed to have this new formulation, "immediately on the confirmation of the government." But those are in fact --

MR. BOUCHER: We -- what the president actually said -- that we expected a Palestinian prime minister will be confirmed soon. Immediately upon confirmation, the road map will be given to the Palestinians, Israelis. Okay? "Confirmation" is the word that I think is generally used in parliamentary systems for the parliamentary approval of a prime minister and his government.

There is also a step of asking someone to form a government, which is -- if you want to break it down to its finer points, is probably the next step that will take place among the Palestinians.

Q So, Richard, you dropped most of your conditions, if that -- only confirmation now -- you are awaiting confirmation.

MR. BOUCHER: I've --

Q I thought you have lists of conditions on the prime minister --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, then you -- then I guess you thought wrong, because this is the way the president put it the other night, and I'm still exactly where he was.

Q Richard, I understand that last week the draft legislation that would empower the prime minister

would meet these conditions that the president talked about. But over the weekend, there has been some back-and-forth between Arafat and the Palestinian legislature on exactly what the powers of the prime ministership would be.

So the question, I think, that we're all asking is, is it just a confirmation of the prime minister, or does it have to sort of at least have the powers that you've been talking about, that were in that draft law? Because there -- it seems to me that it could be a fluid situation right now.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, the creation of the position was -- that they have now approved --

Q (Off mike.)

MR. BOUCHER: -- was the confirmation of the powers.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. BOUCHER: As I remember this, yes, it did evolve over the weekend, but frankly, it evolved in the positive direction of giving the prime minister more powers.

Q Okay.

MR. BOUCHER: And we've always said that's significant -- he's getting significant powers, but the exercise of those powers remains a critical issue.

And he's been given theoretically the ability to exercise broad powers over all the significant areas. We want to see him be able to do that.

Q Still on the Middle East, Richard. Have you guys heard back from the Israelis yet about their investigation into the death of Ms. Corrie?

MR. BOUCHER: Let me double check on that.

(Pause.)

Let me go into the background, if I can, because I don't think I've done this on the record yet. But our American embassy in Tel Aviv learned of the death of Miss Rachel Corrie on Sunday, March 16th. She was killed in the Southern Gaza Strip during the course of an Israeli army operation. The United States deeply regrets this tragic death of an American citizen. We offer our sincere condolences to Miss Corrie's family. We're in contact with the family and providing all possible assistance to them.

Our concerns are being made known at the highest levels and we've called upon the government of Israel and the Israeli Defense Force to conduct immediate and full investigation into the circumstances of this death. We understand that the Israelis have announced that they have begun an investigation. We look forward to learning the results of any investigation. We again call on the Israeli Defense Force to undertake all possible measures to avoid harm to civilians. And I'd point out we do have a travel warning for Israel, the West Bank and Gaza that was updated on March 16th to reflect the order departure status for family members and non-emergency personnel.

So, in terms of what we've heard back from the Israeli government at this point, it's just that they are conducting an investigation.

Q Richard, do you have anything on an American being killed in Yemen today?

(Pause.)

Q But what about the demolishing of the houses? You didn't talk about it.

MR. BOUCHER: Our position on -- our policy position on demolishing houses has been expressed many, many times and it remains the same as before.

Q But because of this tragedy, you don't think you should stop it -- call for stoppage of it, or no?

MR. BOUCHER: We have made very clear we're opposed to demolishing houses. We've been opposed to it for a long time.

As far as situation in Yemen, there's an American citizen, an employee of Hunt Oil, who was shot and killed today in Marib, Yemen. A Yemeni citizen and a Canadian citizen were also killed, and another Canadian citizen was wounded in the shooting accident. We understand the assailant killed himself. Our sincerest condolences go to the family of this American citizen and to the families of those whose loved ones died.

In deference to the family of the American citizen, we're not releasing the name of the deceased individual at this time. We will provide all possible assistance to the family.

And we've also offered our assistance to the injured and the other deceased individuals -- families of the other deceased individuals.

Motives behind the incident are not yet clear, so it's premature to speculate on why this happened and what the motives might have been. But obviously, we condemn the violence involved.

We've been in touch with the Yemeni authorities. There's a U.S. investigative team in Marib already this evening to help the Yemeni government in investigating the incident.

We've notified -- our embassy in Sana'a has notified the American citizen community of the incident through the warden system. We've reiterated the information in our November 30th, 2002 travel warning for Yemen, which remains in effect, and which continues to urge American citizens to defer all travel to Yemen.

Okay, Joel?

Q Richard, when this war commences, are you also putting warnings out to various terrorist groups, wherever they may be, to cease and desist?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't exactly know what -- we don't necessarily have direct channels into the terrorist groups. But I think we've made quite clear that no one -- and first of all, terrorism won't be tolerated, period. The president's made that clear repeatedly. But no one should try to take advantage of any conflict with Iraq to perpetrate horrible crimes and killings and terrorism elsewhere, and that we will deal with that as severely as we would any other sorts of terrorist activities.

Yes?

Q And also, with regard to logistics, obviously, when this does commence, there are profiteers, there are others that want to hoard food and medicines and such. Does the same thing apply, that they --

MR. BOUCHER: I actually -- given the U.S. -- size of the U.S. economy, I certainly, domestically, I haven't heard that kind of fear expressed.

Q Thank you.

MR. BOUCHER: Thank you.

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A Worried World Shows Discord

By ALAN COWELL

LONDON, March 18 — President Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein drew stinging criticism from France and Germany today, with President Jacques Chirac denouncing the decision to resort to war as illegal and wrongheaded.

In Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered an impassioned defense of his alliance with Mr. Bush but faced a major revolt in his Labor Party as Parliament engaged in a daylong debate over going to war with Iraq.

In a final vote, 139 of the 410 Labor legislators voted against the government. Thanks to backing from the Conservative opposition, the overall vote was 412 to 149 in favor of Mr. Blair.

As the world absorbed Mr. Bush's decision, it appeared worried and divided.

America's rationale for using force exposed an overwhelming opposition to war in many nations and a growing resignation as it approached.

Appearing on French television, Mr. Chirac stuck firmly to the position that Iraq posed no actual threat today and that war was unnecessary.

"Whether it involves the necessary disarmament of Iraq or the desirable change of the regime in this country, there is no justification for a unilateral decision to resort to force," the French president said. "Iraq today does not represent an immediate threat that justifies an immediate war."

He questioned the legality of Mr. Bush's decision, adding, "Throwing off the legitimacy of the United Nations, preferring force over the law, means taking on a heavy responsibility."

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of Germany, a passionate opponent of the military campaign, condemned the move toward an invasion, saying it meant "certain death to thousands of innocent men, women and children." At the same time, though, his spokesman, Bela Anda, said the Berlin government would honor pledges to permit overflights by American planes and the use of American bases in Germany.

Australia's government said it would commit a token 2,000 troops, flying in the face of wide Australian opposition to the deployment.

But in Spain, one of the few other nations along with Japan to openly back President Bush, Prime Minister José María Aznar emphasized that Madrid's support for Washington — which has been greeted with widespread opposition by Spaniards — fell short of combat involvement.

"In the case of a military intervention, Spain will not participate in attack missions," Mr. Aznar said to cheers in the Spanish Parliament. "As a result, there will not be any Spanish combat troops in the theater of operations."

Underscoring the criticism in official circles, a new opinion poll has found increasing popular resentment and hostility toward the United States and Mr. Bush in most of America's major European allies and Russia.

The poll of adults in nine countries, conducted within the last week by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, lends empirical support to critics who say the Bush administration has squandered an outpouring of good will and sympathy among allies and partners in aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

Mr. Bush came in for special criticism from Europeans. Although his approval ratings have held steady at home, respondents across the Atlantic who viewed American policy negatively mostly blamed Mr. Bush rather than a "general problem with America."

Underlying the world's response was a sense that corrosive divisions caused by the crisis would fester, whatever the outcome in Baghdad. Indeed, the European split over Iraq was depicted as further evidence of what critics depict as the continent's impotence in international crises.

Europe's divide, said Prime Minister Costas Simitis of Greece, which holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, illustrates "the need for European countries to finally decide to adopt a common foreign and defense policy" if the Union is to be "effective in any international intervention."

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said 45 nations supported the move to disarm Iraq, including Estonia and Uzbekistan.

The Bush ultimatum prompted weapons inspectors, diplomats and journalists to try to leave Iraq, while some airlines began to cancel flights to the region and foreigners tried to leave the Persian Gulf.

British Airways announced the cancellation of daily flights to Israel and Kuwait. The Dutch and German airlines were reported to have canceled flights to Kuwait scheduled for Wednesday. Two Indian air carriers — Air-India and Indian Airlines — said they were preparing to evacuate as many as 50,000 of the 315,000 Indians working in Kuwait if the conflict threatened that country.

The divisions went far beyond the region itself, cementing a variety of nations from China to Mexico in opposition to America's war plans.

China's newly appointed president, Hu Jintao, took his first cautious steps into international crisis diplomacy in telephone conversations with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and Mr. Chirac.

Kong Quan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said Beijing wanted a peaceful outcome. "We demand that the Iraq question be solved with the United Nations framework," he said. "Under such circumstances, we still urge peace and want to avoid war."

India, too, backed a peaceful approach.

That was also the view from the Vatican, where Pope John Paul II has tried in vain to persuade world leaders to avoid war. Joaquín Navarro-Valls, the papal spokesman, said: "Whoever decides that all peaceful means available under international law are exhausted assumes a grave responsibility before God, his own conscience and history."

The sense of unhappiness, resignation and frustration extended to Moscow, where the lower house of Parliament, in a largely symbolic gesture, postponed a vote on a landmark treaty with the United States to reduce nuclear arsenals. But the Kremlin's reaction reflected a concern to keep communication open.

In a telephone call initiated by the White House, President Putin "expressed regret that Washington issued an ultimatum and that intensive diplomatic efforts did not lead to a mutually acceptable compromise," the Kremlin's press service said.

"It was stressed that in any situation the U.N. and its Security Council are called on to play a central role in ensuring international peace and stability," the press service said. "Both parties emphasized that despite differences in approaches and assessments, maintaining bilateral ties in critical situations like the present one are of special importance."

Mr. Putin's adviser on strategic issues, the hawkish former defense minister, Marshal Igor D. Sergeev, sounded more bleak. He told the Interfax news service that "the consequences for international security in the event of a new war in Iraq would be unpredictable and extremely negative."

In the protracted diplomacy leading up to the ultimatum, the United States and Britain calculated that they had won unequivocal support from several former Warsaw Pact allies of Moscow now poised to join the European Union.

Those nations seemed more muted today.

The Czech defense minister, Jaroslav Tvrdík, told journalists that Czech soldiers would take part only in cleaning up after the use of any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Slovakia, which has sent a nuclear, chemical and biological warfare defense and cleanup unit to Kuwait, said it would not withdraw its

support.

But Hungary's government said it would not send troops or combat units to Iraq, limiting its support to the use of the Taszar Air Base, where hundreds of Iraqi émigrés are being trained as liaison officers for American forces in the gulf.

Poland took the hardest line of support, pledging 200 troops, most of whom are already in the gulf.

The Eastern European countries are torn between American pressure and French threats that their membership of the European Union could be called into question if they back the military campaign.

Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz of Poland, who visited Paris on Monday, said, "It is clear, unfortunately, that question marks hang over the future and the efficacy of the United Nations, question marks hang over the future of the European Union as well as over the efficacy of NATO."

Perhaps the most plaintive appeal for restraint came from an organization representing the 120 "human shields" who have traveled to Iraq to try to prevent military strikes. In a letter to Mr. Blair, they urged him to protect sites where human shields are deployed from bombing attacks.


"We call on the public to support the brave men and women from Britain who have placed themselves in harm's way in order to try and protect the innocent people of Iraq," the letter said.

The Pew poll showed a serious disconnect between Americans and their traditional allies. While 59 percent of Americans supported a war to remove President Hussein, only 39 percent of Britons and 13 percent of the Spanish favored military action.

The survey demonstrated how anger toward America has intensified in recent months. In Germany, for example, only 25 percent of respondents had a favorable opinion of the United States, down from 61 percent last June.

In France, where last year 63 percent of respondents held a mostly favorable view of the United States, the number has fallen to 31 percent. Similarly, in Italy, the favorable opinions fell to 34 percent from 70 percent.

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
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The Supporters

Thirty countries have agreed to be listed as supporting in some way the United States campaign to disarm Iraq. Some Arab governments that are giving support did not want to be included on the official list.

- PLEDGING SUPPORT
- CONTRIBUTING MILITARILY



Source: State Department

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Utanríkisráðuneytið

Minnisblað

Viðtakandi: **Ráðherra**
Sendandi: **Alþjóðaskrifstofa**
Dagsetning: **19. mars 2003**
Málsnúmer: **UTN02080276**
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Efni: Aðgerðir gegn Írak: gagnlegar upplýsingar og réttlætning aðgerða nú.

Í framhaldi af minnisblöðum og upplýsingum til ráðherra undanfarna daga, opinberun lista Bandaríkjastjórnar yfir þau ríki sem fylgja þeim að málum, fylgir hér samantekt um réttlætningu fyrir aðgerðum gegn Íraksstjórn. Þá fylgja jafnframt hugleiðingar um mögulegan framgang stríðs komi til átaka. Margt virðist benda til að Bandaríkin ásamt bandamönnum muni láta til skarar skríða á fimmtudag.

Listi yfir þau 30 ríki sem styðja Bandaríkin og Bretland var lesin upp í fréttum á CNN sjónvarpsstöðinni kl. 18:30 (ísl. tíma) í gær (18. mars). Þá höfðu, þrátt fyrir beiðni íslenskra stjórnvalda, ekki borist upplýsingar frá bandarískum stjórnvöldum um það hvernig þau hygðust nota listann eða hvenær og með hvaða hætti hann yrði gerður opinber. Enn vantar upplýsingar um það frá bandarískum stjórnvöldum hvað felist í því að vera á þessum 30 ríkja lista. Fátt hefur verið um svör í þeim efnum og virðist sem það sé bandarískum stjórnvöldum ekki fullljóst sjálfum. Höfðu fulltrúar ráðuneytis m.a. spurt fulltrúa BNA sendiráðsins fyrir þann sama dag hvort Íslendingar gætu átt von á því, öllum að óvörum, að listinn yrði birtur á CNN eða í öðrum fjölmiðli. Meðfylgjandi er athyglisverð frásögn sendiráðs Íslands í Washington af fundi með Heather Conley, sem fram fór í gær, og varðar stöðu Íslands í ljósi stuðnings stjórnvalda við hernaðaraðgerðir gegn Íraksstjórn. Meginefni minnisblaðsins hér að neðan mætti nýta mætti í viðtölum við fjölmiðla.

I. Aðdragandi aðgerða - mælirinn fullur:

Í apríl 1991 að Flóabardaga loknum var Írak gefinn 15 daga frestur til að gefa ítarlega yfirlýsingu um gereyðingarvopn sín (sem notuð höfðu verið bæði gegn Írönum og Írökum sjálfum (Kúrdum)). Í kjölfar stríðsins kom í ljós að fyrirætlanir Íraka um að koma sér upp gereyðingarvopnum voru langtum umfangsmeiri en menn hafði grunað. S.þ sáu að grípa þurfti tafarlaust til aðgerða gegn þessum fyrirætlunum og sveit vopnaeftirlitsmanna (UNSCOM) var komið á fót. Þeim var ætlað að ljúka verki sínu á þeim 15 daga fresti sem veittur var. Yfirlýsing Íraksstjórnar sem gefin var að fresti loknum var helber uppspuni og hófst þá hinn 12 ára skollaleikur, sem líkur eru á að taki brátt enda. Það var fyrst árið 1992 sem Írakar viðurkenndu að þeir hefðu átt gereyðingarvopn en kváðust þá hafa eytt þeim. Í október 1994 hættu Írakar með öllu að vinna með vopnaeftirlitsmönnum. Var þeim hótad hernaðaríhlotun og þá fyrst hófst vopnaeftirlit að nýju. Enn og aftur voru gefnar út yfirlýsingar sem Írakar viðurkenndu síðar að væru falsaðar. Árið 1997 var

vopnaeftirlitsmönnum meinaður aðgangur að vissum svæðum. Síðar sama ár hótuðu BNA-menn og Bretar að beita hervaldi fengju vopnaeftirlitsmenn ekki að sinna starfi sínu. Enn voru Írakar við sama heygarðshornið og reyndu hvað þeir gátu til að torvela störf vopnaeftirlitsmanna. Jafnvel fór Kofi Annans til Bagdad og samningar við stjórnvöld árið 1998 báru skammvinnan árangur. Fór svo að síðar sama ár yfirgáfu vopnaeftirlitsmenn Írak. Árið 1999 var enn á ný sett upp lið til vopnaeftirlits, en Saddam Hussein meinaði þeim að koma til landsins. Þar við sat þar til söguleg eining náðist í öryggisráði S.þ í nóvember s.l. um ályktun nr. 1441. Ekki verður séð hvernig treysta megí orðum Íraka um að þeir hafi eyðilögð öll geryðingarvopn sín. Miðað við það sem að framan er gengið er hæpið að treysta megí orðum Saddams Husseins. Í fjögur ár fór ekkert vopnaeftirlit fram í Írak, þ.e. milli 1998 og 2002. Margt getur gerst á 4 árum. Yfirlýsing Íraka frá 8. desember s.l. var einnig upplogin og þar með hefur Írak brotið gegn ályktun 1441. Vopnaeftirlitsmenn hafa ekki fengið svör við öllum þeirra fyrirspurnum:

Þegar vopnaeftirlitsmenn yfirgáfu Írak árið 1999 áttu írösk stjórnvöld eftir að gera grein fyrir:

- 10 þúsund lítrum af anthrax (miltisbrandur)
- víðtækri VX eiturefnaáætlun
- allt að 6500 efnavopnasprengjum
- a.m.k. 80 tonn af sinnepsgasi, hugsanlega 10 sinnum meira magn
- óþekktu magni af sarín, bótulinum toxin og önnur lífefnavopn
- Scud eldflaugakerfi

Í síðustu skýrslu vopnaeftirlits S.þ frá 7. mars s.l. er skrá yfir 29 svið þar sem vopnaeftirlitinu hafði ekki tekist að fá umbeðnar upplýsingar. Saddam Hussein er enn að leika sama gamla leikinn. Eini munurinn nú er sá að honum hefur tekist að slá ryki í augun á stjórnvöldum víða um heim, og samtímis sundrað S.þ, Evrópusambandinu og Atlantshafsbandalaginu, sem er mjög alvarlegt. Samkomulag var í augsýn í síðustu viku um lokafrest fyrir Írak, eða þar til Frakkland tilkynnti að það myndi ekki samþykkja nýja ályktun, hverjar sem kringumstæður væru. Mestu skiptir nú að reyna til þrautar að finna leiðir til að sameina ríki þessi á ný. Baráttan gegn alþjóðlegum hryðjuverkasamtökum og ógnarstjórn sem búa yfir geryðingarvopnum heldur áfram. Sameinaðs átaks er þörf.

Koma verður í veg fyrir að Saddam Hussein nái að koma sér upp kjarnorkuvopnum. Með yfirráð yfir kjarnorkuvopnum hefði heimsbyggðin ekki lengur tök á að ráða niðurlögum hans án ógnvænlegra afleiðinga. Eins og Blair sagði, verða Bandaríkjamenn og Bretar ekki sakaðir um ópolinmæði, þvert á móti hefur Saddam Hussein verið sýnt allt of mikið langlundargeð, vegna þess að stríð og átök eru öllum lítt hugnanleg og menn héldu í vonina um að stjórnvöld í Írak myndu afvopnast án valdbeitingar. Það er stórhættulegt ef ógnarstjórn á borð við þá sem Saddam Hussein leiðir í Bagdad sjái sér leik á borði þegar alþjóðasamfélagið er sundrað í afstöðu sinni - notfæri sér veikleika samfélagsins - hvað næst þegar einræðisherra ógnar heimsbyggðinni, hver mun trúa okkur þá. Í því ljósi skiljanlegt af hverju Japan og S-Kórea nágrannar N-Kóreu sem býr yfir kjarnavopnum, eru meðal þeirra ríkja sem styðja BNA og Bretland.

S.þ verða að framfylgja ályktunum öryggisráðsins (sbr. ræðu utanríkisráðherra í allsherjarþingi S.þ s.l. haust). S.þ verða að loknum átökum að álykta um nauðsynlegt uppbyggingarstarf í Írak (Ísland hefur tilkynnt þátttöku í því). Írak að loknu stríði verður að vera í höndum S.þ. Ljóst er að Ísland mun þurfa að leggja sinn skerf að mörkum með fjárframlagi til mannúðarstarfs á meðan átökum í Írak stendur og svo að uppbyggingarstarfi í kjölfar átakanna, sbr. orð forsætisráðherra í Mbl. í morgun (19. mars).

Írak er ríkt land og engin ástæða til þeirrar hungursneyðar sem þar ríkir. 60% Íraka

treysta nú á matargjafir. Þúsundir barna deyja árlega úr hungri og vegna skorts á lyfjum. Fjórar milljónir Íraka eru í útlegð. Stjórnarandstæðingar eru fangelsaðir og pyntaðir. Þessu ástandi verður að breyta.

II. Lögmæti aðgerða - ályktanir öryggisráðs S.þ.

Til upprýfjunar og ítrekunar:

Saddam Hussein hefur nú haft meira en 12 ár til þess að fara að vopnahlésskilmálum öryggisráðsins frá því að Flóabardaga lauk 1991. Á þessum tíma hefur öryggisráðið samþykkt hátt á annan tug ályktana sem Írösk stjórnvöld hafa allar virt að vettugi.

Íslensk stjórnvöld hafa alla tíð lagt áherslu á friðsamlega lausn Íraksdeilunnar og að hún yrði leyst á vettvangi Sameinuðu þjóðanna. Diplómatískar leiðir hafa nú verið reyndar til þrautar í Íraksmálinu og nú er ljóst að deilan verður ekki leyst á vegum öryggisráðsins. Ágreiningurinn við stjórnvöld í Írak er kominn á það alvarlegt stig að ekkert nema tafarlausn afvopnun Íraks kemur til greina.

Aðgerðir Bandaríkjanna og fl. ríkja gegn Írak byggja einkum á eftirfarandi þremur ályktun öryggisráðsins:

Með ályktun öryggisráðsins **nr. 678** frá 29. nóvember 1990 var valdbeiting heimiluð til að hrekja Íraksher frá Kúveit.

Öryggisráðið samþykkti hinn 3. apríl 1991 ályktun **nr. 687**, þar sem vopnahlésskilmálar Íraka voru skilgreindir. Þessir skilmálar lögðu m.a. þá skyldu á herðar Írak að afvopnast og útrýma öllum gereyðingarvopnum sínum undir alþjóðlegu eftirliti. Þessir skilmálar hafa allir verið þverbrotnir.

Öryggisráðið samþykkti svo hinn 8. nóvember 2002 ályktun **nr. 1441**, sem hnykkir á meginkröfum allra fyrri ályktana öryggisráðsins varðandi afvopnun Íraks. Samkvæmt þessari ályktun var staðfest að Írak hefði verið og væri brotlegt við fyrri ályktanir öryggisráðsins, sérstaklega með því að vinna ekki með vopnaeftirlitsmönnum Sameinuðu þjóðanna og Alþjóðakjarnorkumálastofnunarinnar. Írökum var jafnframt veittur lokafrestur til þess að afvopnast. Í lok ályktunarinnar minnir öryggisráðið á það að það hafi ítrekað varað Írak við “alvarlegum afleiðingum” þess ef Írak héldi áfram að brjóta gegn skyldum sínum.

Kjarni ofangreindra ályktana er:

-Framleiðsla og eign Íraka á gereyðingarvopnum er ógn við alþjóðlegan frið og öryggi,

-Írak hefur ekki afvopnast eins og landinu ber skylda til,

-Írak hefur brotið gegn ákvæðum vopnahlésskilmálanna frá 1991.

Að vísu má segja að afdráttarlaus ályktun öryggisráðsins sem heimili aðgerðir gegn Írak liggi ekki fyrir. Það er því ljóst að deilt verður um lögmæti þessara aðgerða. Það má hinsvegar færa sterk rök fyrir því að framangreindar ályktanir feli í sér víðtækar heimildir til að fylgja eftir kröfum alþjóðasamfélagsins um afvopnun. Minna má á að árið 1999 hóf Atlantshafsbandalagið árás á Serbíu vegna ofsókna þarlendra stjórnvalda á íbúa Kósovo, án sérstakrar ályktunar öryggisráðsins. Innrás Bandaríkjanna og bandamanna þeirra í Afganistan var einnig gerð án beinnar ályktunar öryggisráðsins.

III. Mat á hugsanlegri þróun hernaðaráttaka í Írak.

Ný hernaðartækni:

Miklar framfarir á hernaðarsviðinu hafa átt sér stað síðan Persaflóastríðið var háð og hafa Bandaríkjamenn leitt þá þróun. Hernaðartækni, búnaður og þjálfun hermanna á jörðu, í lofti og á sjó, sérstaklega meðal Breta og Bandaríkjamanna er nú miklu betri en þá var. Þetta á sérstaklega við um þann þátt er lýtur að upplýsingaöflun (intelligence) um staðsetningu og fyrirætlanir óvinarins yfir allt átakasvæðið, en áður hafa slíkar upplýsingar ávallt verið af skornum skammti, sérstaklega eftir að átök eru hafin, sbr. máltekið "the fog of war", eða þoka stríðsins. Þannig hafa Bandamenn nú getu til þess að hafa góða yfirsýn yfir allt átakasvæðið á sama tíma og þeir geta komið í veg fyrir að Írakar fylgist með eigin aðgerðum og liðsflutningum. Þessi þróun gerir Bandamönnum því kleift að gera árásir á allt landið úr lofti, lági og legi á sama tíma og eru þeir þannig ekki bundnir við ákveðnar hefðbundnar sóknar- og varnarlínur eins og tíðkast hefur.

Framkvæmd hernaðaraðgerða.

Átökin munu hefjast með öflugum loftárásum flugvéla og stýriflauga gegn m.a. stjórnstöðvum, loftvarnarkerfum, eldflaugakerfum, flugvöllum og hernaðarlega mikilvægum samgönguæðum og mannvirkjum samtímis því að sérsveitum verður beitt til að eyðileggja hreyfanleg loftftvarnar- og eldflaugakerfi er kunna að vera staðsett utan við Bagdad. Fallhlífarsveitum og þyrlum mun verða beitt gegn hernaðarlega mikilvægum stöðum í Írak eins og t.d. Norður-Írak og svæðum umherfis Bagdad. Þungamiðja sóknarinnar mun koma frá Kuvait í gegnum borgina Basra og er ekki búist við mikilli andspyrnu íraska hersins þar, vegna þess að sá hluti hersins er vanbúinn og illa þjálfaður hópur manna er gegnir herskyldu. Á sama tíma er einnig gert ráð fyrir sókn úr norðri (ræðst af því hvort Tyrkir leyfa bandarískum hermönnum að fara yfir landamæri Tyrklands og Íraks, en það verður ekki í bili a.m.k.) og að á rúmri viku verði einungis eftir um 20.000 sérsveitir Saddams Hussein ásamt honum í höfuðborginni Bagdad. Núverandi áætlanir Bandamanna gera ráð fyrir því að beita hátæknivopnum til að lama alla andspyrnu íraskra stjórnvalda í höfuðborginni fremur en að sækja inn í hana með herafla. Komi til árása á jörðu niðri í Bagdad getur tími hernaðaráttaka lengst vegna þess hversu erfiðir bardagar í borgum geta verið. Ekki er þó rétt að gera ráð fyrir notkun stórskotaliðsvopna gegn Bagdad líkt og menn muna úr seinni heimstyrjöldinni, heldur fremur úr lofti með nákvæmissprengjum. Séu líkur á verulegri seinkun á uppgjöf herliðs Íraka í Bagdad munu Bandamenn einnig gera árásir á borgina á jörðu niðri með eins mikilli nákvæmni og unnt er til að forðast mannfall. Ætti sú aðgerð ekki heldur að taka langan tíma.

Mannfall og notkun efnavopna.

Sú nýja hernaðartækni sem nú er til reiðu líkt og loftárásir Atlantshafsbandalagsins gegn Fyrrverandi Lýðveldi Júgóslavíu sýndu gera hernaðaraðgerðir gegn Írak mögulegar án þess að af hljótist mikið mannfall óbreyttra borgara. Það er því ekki sjálfsgefið að hernaðaráttök leiði til mikils mannfalls óbreyttra borgara þó það sé ekki heldur hægt að útiloka ef slys verða (t.d. árás gegn loftvarnarbyrgjum). Á sama hátt er ekki sjálfsgefið að Saddam Hussein beiti efnavopnum gegn árásarliðinu þó slíkt sé heldur ekki hægt að útiloka. Verði efnavopn notuð má búast við því að það verði á afmörkuðum svæðum þar sem hann skortir getu til að skjóta eða dreifa slíkum vopnum yfir stærri svæði. Stjórnmálalegar afleiðingar vegna notkunar efnavopna fyrir Saddam Hussein á heimsvísu munu verða alvarlegar og kann

það að minnka líkur á hugsanlegri beitingu þeirra. Hitt er ekki ólíklegt að Saddam Hussein gefi fyrirmæli um íkveikju þeirra 1500 olíulinda sem til eru í Írak og kann sú aðgerð að verða kostnaðarsöm án þess að hafa hernaðarleg áhrif.

Að síðustu er rétt að undirstrika að herafli Bandamanna er fyrsta flokks á meðan her Íraka er annars-eða þriðja flokks. Talið er að Írakar hafi nú á að skipa tæplega 400.000 manna her sem búinn er um 2000 skriðdrekum og rúmlega 300 orustuflugvélum. Ástand íraska hersins er talið lélegt og búnaður bæði úreltur og illa viðhaldið. Andspænis þeim standa um 300.000 vel búnir, þjálfaðir og vopnaðir hermenn Bandamann auk rúmlegra 500 orustuflugvéla og herþyrla ásamt langdrægum sprengjuflugvélum sem staðsettar eru umhverfis landið.

Niðurstaða.

Árás Bandamanna gegn Írak mun verða öflug og hnitmiðuð gegn hernaðarlegum skotmörkum sem leiða mun til þess að borgaralegt mannfall verður minna en margir telja nú líklegt. Andspyrna íraska hersins að sérsveitunum undanskildum verður ekki mikil. Erfiðasta verkefnið verður að hernema höfuðborgina Bagdad. Árás á jörðu niðri á höfuðborgina er líkleg gefist Saddam Hussein og sérsveitir hans ekki upp fljótlega. Notkun efnavopna er möguleg en verður þá afmörkuð og mun ekki hafa teljandi hernaðarleg áhrif, en beiting þeirra mun hafa áhrif á viðhorf hins alþjóðlega samfélags. Íkveikja og eyðilegging á olíulindum í Írak er hugsanleg, en sú aðgerð mun heldur ekki hafa hernaðarleg áhrif. Hernaðaraðgerðirnar gegn Írak munu ekki taka langan tíma, þ.e. inna við einn mánuð með fyrirvara um að höfuðborgin Bagdad komist fljótlega í hendur Bandamanna. Notkun sprengja búnum úranskertum oddum (DU) mun verða sama vandamál og þegar loftárásir Atlansthafsbandalagsins gegn Fyrrverandi Lýðveldi Júgóslavíu áttu sér stað.

Sverige regeringens uppfattning i Irakfrågan (2003-03-19)

Om USA och dess allierade attackerar Irak utan FN-mandat agerar man i strid med folkrätten, vilket den svenska regeringen djupt beklagar. Endast FNs säkerhetsråd och ingen enskild stat har att utvärdera det irakiska agerandet och rätt att besluta om våldsanvändning.

Den svenska regeringen delar inte USAs åsikt om att folkrättsligt stöd föreligger för att använda militärt våld. Vår uppfattning är att USA inte kan stödja sig på de säkerhetsrådsresolutioner som antagits i början på 1990-talet. Våldsmandatet var tillämpligt på en annan situation än den som vi står inför idag. Inte heller resolution 1441 ger mandat för våldsanvändan.


Sveriges regering anser att Irak utgör ett hot mot internationell fred och säkerhet då man startat två krig mot sina grannar, använt massförstörelsevapen och angripit andra länder i regionen. Massförstörelsevapen i händerna på denna regim innebär därigenom ett sådant hot, vilket FN uppmärksammat alltsedan invasionen av Kuwait 1990.

Regeringen har kunnat acceptera militära insatser mot Irak som en sista utväg om Irak vägrat att samarbeta med FNs säkerhetsråd i enlighet med resolution 1441, och Irak fortsatt att utveckla eller inneha massförstörelsevapen. En förutsättning är dock att sådana militära aktioner auktoriseras av FNs säkerhetsråd.

Svenska förband kommer inte att delta i en militär operation som vi anser bryter mot folkrätten.

Även om en militär insats kommer att genomföras utan FN-mandat har FN en central roll att spela, inte minst i hanteringen av den humanitära situationen, men även i ett Irak efter krig. Frågan om konfliktens hanterande måste återföras till FN och säkerhetsrådet. Även om USA tillgriper militärt våld så fortsätter säkerhetsrådet att ha det yttersta ansvaret för internationell fred och säkerhet.

Från svensk sida följer vi nära utvecklingen av den humanitära situationen i Irak och har beredskap för att i samverkan med FN, EU och andra internationella aktörer på kort varsel bidra med extra stödinsatser på det humanitära området och till flyktingar i regionen, skulle ett sådant behov uppstå. Sverige är en av de största bidragsgivarna vad gäller humanitärt bistånd till Iraks befolkning, det årliga biståndet uppgår till ca 50 MSEK.



SITUATION IN IRAQ

**Declaration by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic
Elysée Palace, March 18, 2003**

Ever since the beginning of the Iraq crisis, France has endeavoured to make possible the necessary disarmament of Iraq under United Nations authority. This disarmament is under way, as the inspectors have been demonstrating. France has acted in the name of the primacy of the law and in accordance with her conception of relations between peoples and between nations.

True to the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which is our common law, France considers that recourse to force is the last resort, when all other options have been exhausted.

France's position is shared by the great majority of the international community. The most recent debates have clearly shown that the Security Council was not prepared, under present circumstances, to approve a precipitate march to war.

The United States has just issued an ultimatum to Iraq. Whether, I repeat, it's a matter of the necessary disarmament of Iraq or of the desirable change of regime in that country, there is no justification for a unilateral decision to resort to war.

Regardless of the forthcoming developments, this ultimatum is calling into question our idea of international relations. It affects the future of a people, the future of a region, world stability.

It is a grave decision, at a time when Iraq's disarmament is under way and the inspections have proved to be a credible alternative method of disarming that country. It is also a decision which jeopardizes future use of methods to resolve peacefully crises linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Iraq does not today present an immediate threat warranting an immediate war. France appeals to everyone to act responsibly to ensure the respect of international legality. It appeals to them to maintain the Security Council's unity by staying within the framework set by UNSCR 1441.

To act outside the authority of the United Nations, to prefer the use of force to compliance with the law, would incur a heavy responsibility./.

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SITUATION IN IRAQ

**Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the French Republic
Elysée Palace, March 18, 2003**

An ultimatum has just been issued to Iraq, without consultation of the United Nations Security Council. This unilateral decision goes against the will of the Security Council and the international community, which desire to pursue Iraq's disarmament in accordance with UNSCR 1441.

Regardless of the goal pursued, France reiterates that the Security Council alone is authorized to legitimize the use of force.

France appeals to everyone to act responsibly to ensure respect for international legality. To act outside the authority of the United Nations, to prefer the use of force to compliance with the law, would incur a heavy responsibility./.

SITUATION IN IRAQ

**Address by Dominique de Villepin, French Foreign Minister, before the United Nations Security Council.
New York, March 19, 2003**

Mr. President,
Mr. Secretary-General,
Ministers,
Ambassadors,

We are meeting here today a few hours before the weapons sound. To exchange our convictions again in observance of our respective commitments. But also to outline together the paths that must allow us to recover the spirit of unity.

I wish to reiterate here that for France war can only be the exception, and collective responsibility the rule. Whatever our aversion for Saddam Hussein's cruel regime, that holds true for Iraq and for all the crises that we will have to confront together.

* * *

1 – To Mr. Blix, who presented his work program to us, and Mr. ElBaradei, who was represented today, I want to say thank you for the sustained efforts and results achieved. Their program is a reminder that there is still a clear and credible prospect for disarming Iraq peacefully. It proposes and prioritizes the tasks for such disarmament and presents a realistic timetable for their implementation.

In doing so the report confirms what we all know here: Yes, the inspections are producing tangible results. Yes, they offer the prospect of effective disarmament through peaceful means and in shorter time-frames.

The path we mapped out together in the context of resolution 1441 still exists. In spite of the fact that it has been interrupted today, we know that it will have to resume as soon as possible.

The Council took note two days ago of the Secretary-General's decision to withdraw the inspectors and all UN personnel from Iraq. The discharge of their mandates has consequently been suspended. It will be necessary when the time comes to complete our knowledge about Iraq's programs and finish disarming Iraq. The contribution of the inspectors will be decisive at that time.

2 – Make no mistake about it: the choice is indeed between two visions of the world.

To those who choose to use force and think they can resolve the world's complexity through swift and preventive action, we offer in contrast determined action over time. For today, to ensure our security, all the dimensions of the problem must be taken into account: both the manifold crises and their many facets, including cultural and religious. Nothing lasting in international relations can be built therefore without dialogue and respect for the other, without exigency and abiding by principles, especially for the democracies that must set the example. To ignore this is to run the risk of misunderstanding, radicalization and spiraling violence. This is even more true in the Middle East, an area of fractures and ancient conflicts where stability must be a major objective for us.

To those who hope to eliminate the dangers of proliferation through armed intervention in Iraq, I wish to say that we regret that they are depriving themselves of a key tool for other crises of the same type. The Iraq crisis allowed us craft an instrument, through the

inspections regime, which is unprecedented and can serve as an example. Why, on this basis not envision establishing an innovative, permanent structure, a disarmament body under the United Nations?

To those who think that the scourge of terrorism will be eradicated through the case of Iraq, we say they run the risk of failing in their objectives. The outbreak of force in this area which is so unstable can only exacerbate the tensions and fractures on which the terrorists feed.

3 – Over and above our division, we have a collective responsibility in the face of these threats, the responsibility to recover the unity of the international community. The United Nations must remain mobilized in Iraq to aid this objective. Together, we have duties to assume in this perspective.

- First of all, to staunch the wounds of war. As always, war brings with it its share of victims, suffering and displaced people. So it is a matter of urgency to prepare now to provide the requisite humanitarian assistance. This imperative must prevail over our differences. The Secretary-General has already begun to mobilize the various UN agencies to this end. France will take its full part in the collective effort to assist the Iraqi people. The oil-for-food program must be continued under the authority of the Security Council with the necessary adjustments. We are waiting for the Secretary-General's proposals.

- Next, it is necessary to build peace. No country by itself has the means to build Iraq's future. In particular, no state can claim the necessary legitimacy. It is from the United Nations alone that the legal and moral authority can come for such an undertaking. Two principles must guide our action: respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; and the preservation of its sovereignty.

- By the same token, it is for the United Nations to set out the framework for the country's economic reconstruction. A framework that will have to affirm the two complementary principles of transparency and development of the country's resources for the benefit of the Iraqis themselves.

4 – Our mobilization must also extend to the other threats that we have to address together.

Given the very nature of these threats, it is no longer possible today to address them in any old order. By way of example, terrorism is fueled by organized crime networks; it cleaves to the contours of lawless areas; it thrives on regional crises; it garners support from the divisions in the world; it utilizes all available resources, from the most rudimentary to the most sophisticated, from the knife to the weapons of mass destruction it is trying to acquire.

To deal with this reality, we must act in a united way and on all fronts at the same time.

5 – So we must remain constantly mobilized.

In this spirit France renews its call for the heads of state and government to meet here in the Security Council to respond to the major challenges confronting us.

Let us intensify our fight against terrorism. Let us fight mercilessly against its networks with all the economic, juridical and political weapons available to us.

Let us give new impetus to the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. France has already proposed that our heads of state and government meet on the sidelines of the next General Assembly to define together the new priorities for our action.

Let us recover the initiative in the regional conflicts that are destabilizing entire regions. I am thinking in particular of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. How much suffering must the peoples

of the region still endure for us to force the doors to peace? Let us not resign ourselves to the irreparable.

In a world where the threat is asymmetrical, where the weak defy the strong, the power of conviction, the capacity to convince, the ability to sway opinion count as much as the number of divisions. They do not replace them. But they are the indispensable aids of a state's influence.

6 – Faced with this new world, it is imperative that the action of the international community should be guided by principles.

First of all, respect for law. The keystone of international order, it must apply in all circumstances, but even more so when the gravest decision is to be made: to use force. Only on this condition can force be legitimate. Only on this condition can it restore order and peace.

Next, the defense of freedom and justice. We must not compromise with what is central to our values. We will be listened to and heeded only if we are inspired by the very ideals of the United Nations.

Lastly, the spirit of dialogue and tolerance. Never have the peoples of the world aspired so forcefully to its respect. We must listen to their appeal.

* * *

As we see clearly, the United Nations has never been so necessary. It is up to this body to harness all the resolve to meet these challenges. Because the United Nations is the place where international rules and legitimacy are founded. Because it speaks in the name of peoples.

In response to the clash of arms there must be a single upwelling of the spirit of responsibility, voice and gesture from the international community that is gathered here in New York, in the Security Council.

This is in the interest of all: the countries engaged in the conflict, the states and peoples in the region, the international community as a whole. Confronted with a world in crisis, we have a moral and political obligation to restore the threads of hope and unity.

The judgment of future generations will depend on our capacity to meet this great challenge—in furtherance of our values, our common destiny and peace.

Thank you./.

Trúnaðarmál

Til ráðherra, ráðuneytisstjóra og Stefáns Skjaldarsonar
Frá þjóðréttarfræðingi

20. mars 2003

Minnisblað**Lagalegur grundvöllur til beitingar vopnvalds gagnvart Írak**

1. Meginregla þjóðaréttar er sú að lagt er bann við beitingu vopnvalds af hálfu ríkja gagnvart öðrum ríkjum. Tvær undantekningar eru frá þessari meginreglu:
 - a) Ríkjum er heimilt að beita vopnavaldi í sjálfsvörn, einhliða eða sameiginlegri (51. gr. sáttmála Sameinuðu þjóðanna, sbr. og 5. gr. Norður-Atlantshafssamningsins).
 - b) Heimilt er að beita vopnavaldi samkvæmt ákvörðun öryggisráðsins skv. VII. kafla sáttmála Sameinuðu þjóðanna „til þess að varðveita eða koma aftur á heimsfriði og öryggi“.
2. Samkvæmt almennum lögskýringarsjónarmiðum ber að túlka undantekningar frá meginreglum laga þröngt. Í samræmi við það ber að forðast rúma túlkun á heimildum til beitingar vopnvalds og gera ríkar kröfur við mat á því hvort skilyrði undantekninga frá hinni mikilvægu meginreglu um bann við beitingu vopnvalds séu fyrir hendi. Að því er varðar undantekninguna skv. b-lið að framan sérstaklega ber samkvæmt þessum sjónarmiðum að gera kröfu um að viðkomandi ákvörðun öryggisráðsins um beitingu vopnvalds sé skýr, afdráttarlaus og hafin yfir allan vafa.
3. Í ljósi þessa verður að telja vafasamt að ályktun öryggisráðsins nr. 1441 (2002), sbr. eldri ályktanir ráðsins um Írak, m.a. ályktun nr. 678 (1990), geti talist mynda fullnægjandi lagalegan grundvöll til beitingar vopnvalds gagnvart Írak.
4. Hjálagt fylgir greinargerð breska utanríkisráðuneytisins, dags. 17. mars sl., um lagalegan grundvöll til beitingar vopnvalds gagnvart Írak. Byggt er á því að ályktun öryggisráðsins nr. 678 (1990), sem hafi heimilað aðildarríkjum Sameinuðu þjóðanna að koma á heimsfriði og öryggi á svæðinu, hafi aðeins verið frestað með ályktun nr. 687 (1991) en hafi orðið virk að nýju með ályktun nr. 1441 (2002).
5. Að mati þjóðréttarfræðings er vandfundinn betri rökstuðningur fyrir því að lagalegur grundvöllur sé fyrir hendi til beitingar vopnvalds gagnvart Írak en rökstuðningur breska utanríkisráðuneytisins. Til að mynda væri afar hæpið að byggja hinn lagalega grundvöll fyrst og fremst á því orðalagi ályktunar nr. 1441 (2002) að áframhaldandi brot Íraks á skuldbindingum þess myndu hafa í för með sér alvarlegar afleiðingar (“serious consequences”), enda er þetta orðalag augljóslega allt of óljóst.
6. Framangreindur lagalegur grundvöllur breska utanríkisráðuneytisins verður þrátt fyrir þetta að teljast tæpur. Í því sambandi má m.a. benda á að eðlilegt er að túlka orðalag 12. mgr. ályktunar nr. 1441 (2002) á þá leið að ekki myndi koma til beitingar vopnvalds gagnvart Írak fyrr en öryggisráðið hefði fjallað um málið að nýju og samþykkt ályktun þar að lútandi. Orðalag umrædds ákvæðis er að vísu nokkuð óljóst og breska utanríkisráðuneytið rökstyður gagnstæða túlkun í 11. mgr. greinargerðar sinnar en samkvæmt áðurnefndum lögskýringarsjónarmiðum verður að gera kröfu um

að ákvörðun öryggisráðsins um beitingu vopnavalds sé skýr, afdráttarlaus og hafin yfir allan vafa.

7. Ljóst er að ástæða þess að orðalag ályktana öryggisráðsins um Írak, einkum ályktunar nr. 1441 (2002), er svo óljóst sem raun ber vitni er sú að það er niðurstaða málamiðlunar milli ríkja með mjög ólíkar áherslur. Niðurstaðan er með þeim hætti að viðkomandi ríki telja sig geta túlkað orðalagið hvert á sinn hátt til þess að draga ólíkar ályktanir af því sem samræmast stefnu þeirra. Þetta kemur hvað best fram í mismunandi túlkun á orðalagi áðurnefndrar 12. mgr. ályktunar nr. 1441 (2002). Að mati þjóðréttarfræðings er rétt í opinberri umræðu um hinn lagalega grundvöll til beitingar vopnavalds gagnvart Írak að leggja áherslu á þetta atriði og skapa þannig þá mynd að ýmsir túlkunarkostir komi til greina sem vissulega megji deila um, en ræða að öðru leyti um málið á grundvelli pólitískra sjónarmiða. Í samræmi við það sem áður greinir telur þjóðréttarfræðingur hins vegar að forðast beri eins og framast er kostur að fullyrða að fyrir hendi sé ótvíræður lagalegur grundvöllur til beitingar vopnavalds gagnvart Írak.

Innkomið skjal: Bréf/Fax

21. mars 2003

Málsnúmer	WAS02090019
Fyrirtæki/stofnun	Embassy of the French Republic
Staðsetning	Reykjavík
Nafn	
Heimilisfang (1)	Túngata 22
Heimilisfang (2)	
Póstnúmer	101
Póststaður	REYKJAVÍK
Land	Iceland
Símanúmer	+354 5517621; +354 551 7622
Bréfasími	+354 562 8177
Kennitala	
Skráð	


Tegund innkomins skjals
Bréfalykill:

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Efnisflokkur skjals:
Dagsetning innkomins
skjals:
Staðsetning
Sent til
Efni

Almennt
20.03.2003

Yfirlýsing Frakklandsforseta um ástandið í Írak



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Innkomið skjal

SITUATION IN IRAQ

**Statement by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic.
Paris, March 20, 2003**

My dear compatriots.

The military operations have just begun in Iraq. France regrets this action initiated without United Nations backing. I hope these operations are as swift and cause as little bloodshed as possible, and that they do not lead to a humanitarian catastrophe.

Right to the end, France, with many other countries, strove to convince that the necessary disarmament of Iraq could be obtained by peaceful means. These came to nothing. Regardless of the duration of this conflict, it will be fraught with consequences for the future.

But France, true to her principles – primacy of the law, fairness, dialogue between peoples and respect for others, – will continue to do what she can to ensure that fair, long-term solutions are found to the crises bathing the world in blood or threatening it, through collective action, i.e. in the framework of the United Nations, the only legitimate framework for building peace, in Iraq as elsewhere.


This is why, tomorrow, we shall have to meet again, with our allies, with the whole international community, to take up together the challenges awaiting us.

Similarly, France will not accept Europe remaining unfinished. Europe must realize the need to express its own vision of world problems and support this vision with a credible common defence. France is calling on her partners in the European Union and those going to join it to fulfil this ambition, in the service of peace and prosperity.

I have asked the Prime Minister today to convene a meeting of the government. Acting under his authority, the public authorities are implementing the measures demanded by the situation. Be it a matter of security, the economy or our national cohesion, I want to tell you that we are vigilant and totally mobilized./.

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
EN
ISLANDE

*Avec les compliments
de l'Ambassadeur de France*




UTN	WAS02092019
21. MAR 2003	
Br.	OS D.611
	OS D.514

Innkomið skjal: Fax

21. mars 2003

Málsnúmer	WAS02090019
Fyrirtæki/stofnun	UNESCO
Staðsetning	
Nafn	Koichiro Matsuura
Heimilisfang (1)	Place de Fontenoy
Heimilisfang (2)	
Póstnúmer	F-75352
Póststaður	
Land	France
Símanúmer	
Bréfasími	
Kennitala	
Skráð	
Tegund innkomins skjals	Fax
Bréfalykill:	08.D.611
	08.D.514
Efnisflokkur skjals:	Almennt
Dagsetning innkomins skjals:	21.03.2003
Staðsetning	
Sent til	
Efni	Yfirlýsing frkstj. UNESCO



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Communiqué du Porte-Parole

Office of the Director-General/ Cabinet du Directeur général
Contact: m.dejean@unesco.org
Telephone: 00 33 (1) 45 68 13 26
Fax: 00 33 (1) 45 68 55 59

20 March 2003

Statement by Mr Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO

"As Director-General of an Institution dedicated to constructing the defences of peace in the minds of men through education, science, culture and communication, I can only express my heartfelt emotion, my infinite sadness and my most profound wish that the loss of human life and the scale of suffering and destruction will be reduced to the minimum.

I am determined to ensure UNESCO's full participation in the work of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to be carried out by the United Nations system. It is our duty to do all we can to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people, to help protect their heritage and to build their future. UNESCO is already participating in the coordination machinery established by the United Nations in response to urgent humanitarian needs. But the essential part of our contribution will come after the conflict and will take the form of rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in all our fields of competence. It is there that our experience and our expertise – particularly that acquired under the Oil-for-Food programme, which was the reason for UNESCO's continued presence in Iraq until just a few days ago – will be turned to full account.


Notwithstanding the current international tensions, it is incumbent upon UNESCO to remain true to its founding mission. That "intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind" to which our Constitution refers is today, perhaps even more than ever before, the true guarantee of the unity of the international community. In answer to those who see the present conflict as an expression of the clash of civilizations and religions, we must do all we can to nurture intercultural dialogue and the values of tolerance and mutual respect."

UTN WAS 0289009	
21 MAR 2003	
Brl. 08.D. 611	Abm. 574
08.D. 574	

Innkomið skjal: Fax

21. mars 2003

Málsnúmer	WAS02090019
Fyrirtæki/stofnun	Defense Intelligence Agency
Staðsetning	
Nafn	
Heimilisfang (1)	
Heimilisfang (2)	
Póstnúmer	
Póststaður	
Land	
Símanúmer	
Bréfasími	
Kennitala	
Skráð	
Tegund innkomins skjals	Fax
Bréfalykill:	08.D.611
	08.D.514
Efnisflokkur skjals:	Almennt
Dagsetning innkomins skjals:	21.03.2003
Staðsetning	Skjalasafn WAS
Sent til	
Efni	Upplýsingafundur 26.mars.nk.



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DEFENSE FOREIGN LIAISON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-



U-03, 3110/DXL

21 March 2003

Dear Attaché or Defense Representative,

As a result of current operations in Iraq, DIA will present an intelligence update on Wednesday, 26 March 2003. Attached, please find a response sheet with information on location, time, etc.

Please return the completed response sheet via fax (703-614-8230) as soon as possible. Due to a recent loss of available parking spaces and increased parking restrictions, we encourage you to use the Metro system if possible to get to the Pentagon that day. Parking is available only on a "first arrived/first served" basis and usually fills up very early. If you still intend to come by car, please call 703-614-3254 and provide your vehicle information as soon as possible.

MICHAEL A. HALBERT
Acting Chief
Defense Foreign Liaison

Mnr.: WAS 02090019
Mótt.: Sendiráð Washington
21 MAR 2003
Db.nr. 08.D.021

DIA Intelligence Update on Iraq

Wednesday, 26 March 2003

0900-1000 hours

Pentagon Auditorium

Room 5A1070

We will post Escort Officers at the
Metro and River Entrances only

Response:

Embassy: _____

Rank & Name: _____

I WILL / Will NOT (please circle only one) Attend