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Dags:

26. ágúst 2002

J.B.H.

Síður:

Þessi + 4

Efni:Rök Scowcroft gegn bandarískri innrás í Írak

Til umhugsunar.

UTN02080276	
27 AGÚ. 2002	
Brf. 08.2.611	Ábmr. STX

THE FORUM FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

900 Seventeenth St. N.W. ♦ Suite 502 ♦ Washington, D.C. 20006 ♦ 202-296-9365 ♦ Fax 202-296-9395 ♦ Website: ffip.com

Op-Ed

August 15, 2002

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The attached op-ed, "Don't Attack Saddam" was written by Brent Scowcroft. The op-ed appeared in the August 15th edition of *The Wall Street Journal*. We hope you find it informative.

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OpinionJournal

from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL Editorial Page

AT WAR

Don't Attack Saddam

It would undermine our antiterror efforts.

BY BRENT SCOWCROFT

Thursday, August 15, 2002 12:01 a.m.

Our nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion.

It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when he is gone.

That said, we need to think through this issue very carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq and our other pressing priorities--notably the war on terrorism--as well as the best strategy and tactics available were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.

Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.

That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them.

He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail--much less their actual use--would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.

Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with traditional goals for his aggression. There is little evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.

Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it

may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority--underscored repeatedly by the president--is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.

The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy Saddam's regime. But it would not be a cakewalk. On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive--with serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy--and could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass destruction he possesses.

Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.

But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.

Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict--which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to be clearly within our power to resolve--in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.

Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international support for going after Saddam.

If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather than a competing priority, and significantly shift world opinion toward support for regime change.

In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq--any time, anywhere, no permission required. On this point, senior administration officials have opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not uncovered. And if he

refused, his rejection could provide the persuasive *casus belli* which many claim we do not now have. Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons capability could have a similar effect.

In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much potential for success across the entire range of our security interests--including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region of the world.

Mr. Scowcroft, national security adviser under President Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, is founder and president of the Forum for International Policy.

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Skjal nr. 2

Peace Link
c/o Funabashi Futawa Hospital
5-1-1 Futawa Higashi
Funabashi City, Chiba Prefecture
274-8506 Japan
11th September 2002

The Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Iceland

NO APPEAL TO ARMS AGAINST IRAQ

Dear Sir

Please allow me to introduce myself as a senior pacifist who went through WORLD WAR 2.

I am writing to you to tell that the IRAQ problems in a deeping tense situation is causing grave concern here, and many people who have a knowledge of the holocaust of HIROSHIMA and NAGASAKI in 1945 are expressing anxiety that new-type nuclear bombs would drop on BAGHDAD.

I have a high opinion of your government who has spared no pains in seeking a fair settlement of the matters.

Needless to say, there can be no moral justification for carrying out the preemptive strike against the country because of unprovable weapons of mass destruction.

The attack is against all reason, undoubtedly, against the UN CHARTER in respect of international law and order. Only increasing exertions for peaceful solution can remove the new terror of a holocaust.

On the occasion of the coming UN DISARMAMENT WEEK,

I respectfully urge you to channel your diplomatic effort to stop the imminent strike and to seek an immediate, internationally agreed understanding in the countries concerned.

I am writing in the same terms to the leaders of the countries for no resort to force on the IRAQ problems.

Yours in peace

UTNo 2080276	
16 SEP. 2002	
08.D.611	Abm.
Br. 09.V.611	



YŪJI TOISHI

ADVISER
TO
CHIBA FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC
MEDICAL INSTITUTIONS

5-27-13 NARASHINODAI FUNABASHI
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TEL. 047(468)1811

Skjal nr. 4

Viðvörðun til stjórnvalda ítrekuð

17. September 2002.

Sent til: Forseta Íslands, Forsætisráðherra, Utanríkisráðherra,
Biskup Íslands og Fjölmiðla



Peace 2000 Institute

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105 Reykjavík
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www.peace.is

Fyrir nákvæmlega ári síðan, þann 17. september 2001, varð Friður 2000 Íslensk stjórnvöld við því að að stjórnvöld Bandaríkjunum sigrir undir fólksku flaggi með það sem kallað hefur verið "stríð gegn hryðjuverkum" og að ætlun þeirra væri að notfæra sér ástandið annarlegum liðangi.

Ljóst er að spá Friðar 2000 hefur ræst. Á undanförunum mánuðum hefur hver uppljóstrunin af fætur annarri leitt í ljós að stofnanir undir stjórn Bush bandaríkjaforseta vissu mun meira um aðdraganda og framkvæmd hryðjuverkanna 11. september en þeir hafa viðurkennt.

Grunsemdir hafa aukist á því að Bush og félagar hafi grátíð krókudilstárum yfir hryðjuverkunum, og a.m.k. hafi þeir ekki gert mikið til að stöðva undirbúningsferlið þar sem hryðjuverkin buðu þeim kjörið tækifæri til að innleiða herlög í landinu og til hernaðar á alþjóðlegum vettvangi. Refskákin minnir óneitanlega á brunann í þýska þinginu á síðustu öld sem nú er talið að nasistar hafi sjálfir staðið að til að styrkja völd sín og koma á því einræði sem þurfti til að geta hafið hernað gegn heimsbyggðinni með hugsjónina um þúsund ára ríkið að leiðarljósi.

Bandaríska þingið hefur samþykkt fleiri þingsályktunartillögur sem hafa í raun komið á herlögum í landinu og þann 14. september á síðasta ári veitti þingið Bush nær ótakmarkaða heimild til hernaðar hvar sem er í heiminum. 420 þingmenn létu þekkja sér engins neyðar ein andófsródd. Það var þingkonan Barbara Lee sem í ár fær friðarverðlaun Leifs Eiríkssonar fyrir það hugrekki að greiða atkvæði gegn þessum lögunum og stöðva þannig undirbúningsferlið.

Þá hefur lekið út frá Pentagon áætlun um kjarnorkuvopnaárás á sjö ríki, Kína, Rússland, Íran, Írak, Norður Kóreu, Sýrlandi og Líbú.

Þurfa Íslensk stjórnvöld frekari vitnisburð um hvað er að ske áður en menn taka við sér?

Friður 2000 telur einnig að Íslendingar, sem sú þjóð sem aldrei hefur rekið eigin hernað og sem búið hefur við frið lengur en nokkur önnur þjóð á jörðinni, hafi þá skyldu gagnvart mannkyninu að spyrna við gegn þriðju heimstyrjöldinni og vekja athygli heimsbyggðarinnar á öðrum og friðsamlegri leiðum en blóðugum stríðsárásum til að leysa þau vandamál sem nú blasa við okkur. Friður 2000 býður Íslenskum stjórnvöldum aðstoð samtakanna í að undirbúa og framsetja slíkar hugmyndir til friðar.

Friður 2000 hefur opnað vefinn www.althingi.org með tillögum um hvernig við Íslendingar getum í ljósi sögu okkar og einstakrar stöðu á alþjóða vettvangi, staðið að því að endurvekja friðarferlið í Mið-Austurlöndum.

UTN 02080276	
18. SEP. 2002	
08.D.611	Abm.
Brl. 09.V.611	

ENDING THE WORLD'S END PEACE

Fréttatilkynning

Nánari uppl: Ástþór Magnússon – Sími 8961252 eða 0044 790 5356866



Viðvörðun

17. September 2001

Sent til: Forseta Íslands, Forsætisráðherra, Utanríkisráðherra, Biskup Íslands og Fjölmíðla

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109 Reykjavík
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www.peace.is

Friður 2000 varar við afleiðingum hernaðaraðgerða í hefndarskyni

Um árábil hefur Friður 2000 varað Íslensk stjórnvöld við því að veita blindan stuðning við öfgastefnu Bandaríkjanna í utanríkismálum og ítrekað vakið athygli á að viðskiptabannið á Írak og daglegar loftárásir eru glæpur gegn mannkyninu, eitt versta hryðjuverk mannkynssögunnar.

More than 100 member organisations world-wide
Constituted in Iceland
No. 540795-2669

Við höfum ítrekað varað við því að slíkar aðgerðir muni leiða til hryðjuverka gegn Vesturlöndum. Á undanförunum mánuðum höfum við leitt til þess að þvi að hryðjuverk séu til í New York, Washington eða jafnvel á Íslandi. Hugmyndir um hvernig að við höfum komið fram og þann hræðilega verknað sem nú hefur verið framin í Bandaríkjunum, er það leiðir að okkur sem við höfum verið að mæla.

Viðvörðun: Friður 2000 varar Íslensk stjórnvöld við afleiðingunum af því að styðja ótímabærar hernaðaraðgerðir í hefndarskyni. Forseti Bandaríkjanna hefur leitað eftir stuðningi NATO til að hefja hernaðaraðgerðir gegn skotmörkum í Afganhistan og jafnvel gegn öðrum arabískum þjóðum. Slíkar hefndaraðgerðir munu á engan hátt draga úr hættu á frekari hryðjuverkum heldur leiða hörmungar yfir enn fleiri saklausu borgara og draga heimsbyggðina inn í hringekju hryðjuverka og styrjöld. Full ástæða er að vekja athygli á því að Ísraelsk stjórnvöld hafa nú þegar notfært sér Bandarískar yfirlýsingar um "stríð" til að auka árásir á Palestínnumenn og full ástæða er til að ætla að stjórnvöld í Bandaríkjunum sigli undir fölsku flaggi og ætli einnig að notfæra sér ástandið í annarlegum tilgangi.

Friður 2000 telur að Íslensk stjórnvöld hafi þá skyldu að gegna gagnvart Íslensku þjóðinni að stöðva allar ótímabærar hernaðaraðgerðir undir merkjum NATO með neitunarvaldi sínu hjá samtökunum. Slíkar loftárásir á næstu dögum gætu dregið Íslensku þjóðina inn í blóðuga styrjöld og virkað sem þakki á niðurskipti gegn öðrum mannum.

Friður 2000 telur einnig að Íslendingar, sem sú þjóð sem aldrei hefur rekið eigin hernað og sem hefur verið til staðar í öllum öðrum öðrum þjóðum, hafi þá skyldu að gegna gagnvart Íslensku þjóðinni að spyrja við gegn þjóðheimstýrjöldinni og vekja athygli heimsbyggðarinnar á öðrum og friðsamlegri leiðum en blóðugum stríðsárásum til að leysa þau vandamál sem nú blasa við okkur. Friður 2000 býður Íslenskum stjórnvöldum aðstoð samtakanna í að undirbúa og framsetja slíkar hugmyndir til friðar.

FLYING THE WORLD FOR PEACE

The Peace 2000 Alliance is a network of independent representatives supporting the global work of Peace 2000 International Secretariat: Peace 2000 Institute - 121 Reykjavík - ICELAND.



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Telefax transmission

To:	Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Jones	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	647-5575	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
Date:	October 3, 2002	Pages:	2
Subject:	Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq		

Dear Assistant Secretary Jones,

Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission



EMBASSY OF ICELAND
Washington, D.C.

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Telefax transmission

To:	Director Walter Andrusyszyn	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	456-9150	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
Date:	October 3, 2002	Pages:	2
Subject:	Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq		

Dear Mr. Andrusyszyn,

Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission



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Washington, D.C.

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Telefax transmission

To:	Office of Nordic and Baltic Affairs Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Director	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	736-4170	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
Date:	October 3, 2002	Pages:	2
Subject:	Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq		

Dear Mrs. Fitzpatrick

Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission



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To:	Office of Nordic and Baltic Affairs Kathleen Fitzpatrick, Director	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	736-4170	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
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Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission



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Telefax transmission

To:	Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	703-697-7374	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
Date:	October 3, 2002	Pages:	2
Subject:	Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq		

Dear Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz,

Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission



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Telefax transmission

To:	Deputy Assistant Secretary Ian Brzezinski	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	703-697-5992	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
Date:	October 3, 2002	Pages:	2
Subject:	Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq		

Dear Assistant Secretary Brzezinski,

Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission



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Telefax transmission

To:	Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Mrs. Condoleezza Rice	From:	Guðni Bragason
Fax:	202-456-9490	Ref:	WAS02090019/08.D.611
Date:	October 3, 2002	Pages:	2
Subject:	Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq		

Dear Dr. Rice,

Allow me to forward to you for your information the Prime Minister of Iceland's Statement on Iraq, delivered as a part of the Prime Minister's Policy Statement to the Parliament (Alþingi) on October 1, 2002.

Sincerely,

Gudni Bragason
Deputy Chief of Mission

GOALS★FOR AMERICANS FOUNDATION®



Embracing Our
Responsibility
to the World

Paul Flum
President

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October 4, 2002

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Senate Majority Leader
Senator from South Dakota
United States Senate
509 Hart Senate Office Building
4101 US Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Daschle:

We at Goals for Americans Foundation are profoundly disturbed by the aggressive and belligerent posturing the Bush administration is taking to force Congress to quickly approve a sweeping war-powers resolution toward Iraq.

This stampede to start a preemptive war to remove Saddam Hussein could open a Pandora's box of untold disasters for us, the entire Middle East, and the Iraqi people for sure. President Bush and his like-minded war hawks have little patience – and even less imagination – when it comes to disarming and containing Iraq's weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.

What would a massive preemptive strike and invasion of Iraq bring about?

We believe that all of the good will and support we have garnered since September 11 for our war against international terrorism would largely evaporate. The victims would now be seen as bullies and aggressors. Our actions would produce horrendous Iraqi civilian casualties and earn us the hatred of a whole new generation of Arab youth.

By removing one tyrant who poses no immediate threat to our national interests, our actions will play right into the hands of our real enemies. We could be converting thousands of Arab moderates into al-Qaeda sympathizers or enthusiastic recruits. Our actions could make the war on terrorism an everlasting affair.

Are we willing to bring about this calamity, not to mention untold American casualties, because the Bush administration refuses to consider alternatives?

✓ At Goals for Americans, we have a better idea. We believe that our vast military capabilities could be put to better use by establishing a blockade around Iraq, to shut off the supply of weapons and materials that sustain Hussein's hold on power. We've been enforcing the no-fly zones in the north and south since 1991, so we already have experienced tactical air forces in the region. Shutting off Iraq's minor Persian Gulf

Making Our Vision of the Future a Reality

We sent this letter to all members of Congress last week and wanted to share it with you because of your important position of influence.

UTN02080276
21 OCT. 2002
08 D-611
Brl. Abm. 5186

access would be easy. The most problematic aspect of a blockade would be to close down the over-land black market entry points on the Jordanian, Syrian, Saudi, and Iranian borders.

We could never secure a complete blockade, but we could make life very uncomfortable for Saddam's war machine – and maybe his survival.

An embargo would also serve to reveal which of our friends and enemies are actively trading with Iraq, in violation of 1991 U.N. resolutions. We know that the French, Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans have vigorous trade relationships with Iraq. If they are trading war-making materials for oil, we need to know it, and to hold them accountable in front of the U.N. General Assembly.

President Bush's present course of action is a disaster waiting down the road. The Bush administration has provided no substantial evidence that Saddam Hussein poses an immediate threat to us or our allies. Do we need to force him to live up to the 1991 U.N. disarmament resolutions? Absolutely! Is a preemptive war that could ignite the entire region the only option? Absolutely not!

We at Goals for Americans implore you to resist this rush to war. Time is decidedly on our side, not his. We need to first get behind the United Nations and get the inspection teams back into Iraq, which Saddam has agreed to allow. We need to be relentless in demanding that the teams be allowed to do their jobs. And if all else fails, then a full embargo should be adopted as the final stranglehold.

At Goals for Americans, we are aware that there is a fear in the country that anyone who stands up to oppose this war will be accused of being unpatriotic. It's a tried and true method of silencing the opposition when presidents want to flex their war-making prerogatives.

In truth, there is no more patriotic act than to be heard loud and clear when the talk turns to war. We encourage you to give voice to your conscience over political considerations. And we encourage you to give serious consideration to our suggestions, concerns, and blockade solution.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Paul Flum', with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Paul Flum
President

GOALS★FOR
AMERICANS.
FOUNDATION



Embracing Our
Responsibility
to the World



I WANT YOU TO HOLD YOUR FIRE! **BLOCKADE IRAQ!**

Aggressive War IS NOT a goal for Americans, MR. PRESIDENT.
It is an ill-conceived and desperate move. You have a Better
Option ... to Blockade and Embargo Iraq with U.S. ships, planes
and troops. This IS a goal for Americans ... a tough, workable,
long-term effort to punish and contain Saddam without killing
Iraqi civilians or our own American youth. Also, you
would expose many so-called allies who provide Saddam
with the materials to build his weapons.

An ARMS BLOCKADE is a BETTER OPTION than going to WAR!

Paul Flum, President
Goals for Americans Foundation
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United Nations

S/RES/1441 (2002)

**Security Council**Distr.: General
8 November 2002

Resolution 1441 (2002)**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th meeting, on
8 November 2002***The Security Council,*

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,

Recalling also its resolution 1382 (2001) of 29 November 2001 and its intention to implement it fully,

Recognizing the threat Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security,

Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Further recalling that its resolution 687 (1991) imposed obligations on Iraq as a necessary step for achievement of its stated objective of restoring international peace and security in the area,

Deploring the fact that Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range greater than one hundred and fifty kilometres, and of all holdings of such weapons, their components and production facilities and locations, as well as all other nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to nuclear-weapons-usable material,

Deploring further that Iraq repeatedly obstructed immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to sites designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), failed to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and IAEA weapons

inspectors, as required by resolution 687 (1991), and ultimately ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998,

Deploring the absence, since December 1998, in Iraq of international monitoring, inspection, and verification, as required by relevant resolutions, of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), established in resolution 1284 (1999) as the successor organization to UNSCOM, and the IAEA, and regretting the consequent prolonging of the crisis in the region and the suffering of the Iraqi people,

Deploring also that the Government of Iraq has failed to comply with its commitments pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) with regard to terrorism, pursuant to resolution 688 (1991) to end repression of its civilian population and to provide access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in Iraq, and pursuant to resolutions 686 (1991), 687 (1991), and 1284 (1999) to return or cooperate in accounting for Kuwaiti and third country nationals wrongfully detained by Iraq, or to return Kuwaiti property wrongfully seized by Iraq,

Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the provisions of that resolution, including the obligations on Iraq contained therein,

Determined to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq without conditions or restrictions with its obligations under resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions and recalling that the resolutions of the Council constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance,

Recalling that the effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the Special Commission, and the IAEA is essential for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions,

Noting that the letter dated 16 September 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General is a necessary first step toward rectifying Iraq's continued failure to comply with relevant Council resolutions,

Noting further the letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq laying out the practical arrangements, as a follow-up to their meeting in Vienna, that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA, and expressing the gravest concern at the continued failure by the Government of Iraq to provide confirmation of the arrangements as laid out in that letter,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Kuwait, and the neighbouring States,

Commending the Secretary-General and members of the League of Arab States and its Secretary-General for their efforts in this regard,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. *Decides*, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

3. *Decides* that, in order to begin to comply with its disarmament obligations, in addition to submitting the required biannual declarations, the Government of Iraq shall provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA, and the Council, not later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons, components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological, and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapon production or material;

4. *Decides* that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

5. *Decides* that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government; and instructs UNMOVIC and requests the IAEA to resume inspections no later than 45 days following adoption of this resolution and to update the Council 60 days thereafter;

6. *Endorses* the 8 October 2002 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to General Al-Saadi of the Government of Iraq, which is annexed hereto, and decides that the contents of the letter shall be binding upon Iraq;

7. *Decides* further that, in view of the prolonged interruption by Iraq of the presence of UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in order for them to accomplish the tasks

set forth in this resolution and all previous relevant resolutions and notwithstanding prior understandings, the Council hereby establishes the following revised or additional authorities, which shall be binding upon Iraq, to facilitate their work in Iraq:

- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall determine the composition of their inspection teams and ensure that these teams are composed of the most qualified and experienced experts available;
- All UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, corresponding to those of experts on mission, provided in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have unrestricted rights of entry into and out of Iraq, the right to free, unrestricted, and immediate movement to and from inspection sites, and the right to inspect any sites and buildings, including immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to Presidential Sites equal to that at other sites, notwithstanding the provisions of resolution 1154 (1998) of 2 March 1998;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile programmes and the associated research, development, and production facilities;
- Security of UNMOVIC and IAEA facilities shall be ensured by sufficient United Nations security guards;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones, including surrounding areas and transit corridors, in which Iraq will suspend ground and aerial movement so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site being inspected;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles;
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof; and
- UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right to free import and use of equipment or materials for inspections and to seize and export any equipment, materials, or documents taken during inspections, without search of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or official or personal baggage;

8. *Decides* further that Iraq shall not take or threaten hostile acts directed against any representative or personnel of the United Nations or the IAEA or of any Member State taking action to uphold any Council resolution;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General immediately to notify Iraq of this resolution, which is binding on Iraq; demands that Iraq confirm within seven days of that notification its intention to comply fully with this resolution; and demands

further that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

10. *Requests* all Member States to give full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates, including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since 1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected, the results of which shall be reported to the Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA;

11. *Directs* the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. *Decides* to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;

13. *Recalls*, in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations;

14. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex

Text of Blix/El-Baradei letter

**United Nations Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission**

International Atomic Energy Agency

The Executive Chairman

The Director General

8 October 2002

Dear General Al-Saadi,

During our recent meeting in Vienna, we discussed practical arrangements that are prerequisites for the resumption of inspections in Iraq by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. As you recall, at the end of our meeting in Vienna we agreed on a statement which listed some of the principal results achieved, particularly Iraq's acceptance of all the rights of inspection provided for in all of the relevant Security Council resolutions. This acceptance was stated to be without any conditions attached.

During our 3 October 2002 briefing to the Security Council, members of the Council suggested that we prepare a written document on all of the conclusions we reached in Vienna. This letter lists those conclusions and seeks your confirmation thereof. We shall report accordingly to the Security Council.

In the statement at the end of the meeting, it was clarified that UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be granted immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was termed "sensitive sites" in the past. As we noted, however, eight presidential sites have been the subject of special procedures under a Memorandum of Understanding of 1998. Should these sites be subject, as all other sites, to immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, UNMOVIC and the IAEA would conduct inspections there with the same professionalism.

H.E. General Amir H. Al-Saadi
Advisor
Presidential Office
Baghdad
Iraq

We confirm our understanding that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the right to determine the number of inspectors required for access to any particular site. This determination will be made on the basis of the size and complexity of the site being inspected. We also confirm that Iraq will be informed of the designation of additional sites, i.e. sites not declared by Iraq or previously inspected by either UNSCOM or the IAEA, through a Notification of Inspection (NIS) provided upon arrival of the inspectors at such sites.

Iraq will ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or other relevant items will be destroyed except in the presence of UNMOVIC and/or IAEA inspectors, as appropriate, and at their request.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may conduct interviews with any person in Iraq whom they believe may have information relevant to their mandate. Iraq will facilitate such interviews. It is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to choose the mode and location for interviews.

The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) will, as in the past, serve as the Iraqi counterpart for the inspectors. The Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Centre (BOMVIC) will be maintained on the same premises and under the same conditions as was the former Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The NMD will make available services as before, cost free, for the refurbishment of the premises.

The NMD will provide free of cost: (a) escorts to facilitate access to sites to be inspected and communication with personnel to be interviewed; (b) a hotline for BOMVIC which will be staffed by an English speaking person on a 24 hour a day/seven days a week basis; (c) support in terms of personnel and ground transportation within the country, as requested; and (d) assistance in the movement of materials and equipment at inspectors' request (construction, excavation equipment, etc.). NMD will also ensure that escorts are available in the event of inspections outside normal working hours, including at night and on holidays.

Regional UNMOVIC/IAEA offices may be established, for example, in Basra and Mosul, for the use of their inspectors. For this purpose, Iraq will provide, without cost, adequate office buildings, staff accommodation, and appropriate escort personnel.

UNMOVIC and the IAEA may use any type of voice or data transmission, including satellite and/or inland networks, with or without encryption capability. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may also install equipment in the field with the capability for transmission of data directly to the BOMVIC, New York and Vienna (e.g. sensors, surveillance cameras). This will be facilitated by Iraq and there will be no interference by Iraq with UNMOVIC or IAEA communications.

Iraq will provide, without cost, physical protection of all surveillance equipment, and construct antennae for remote transmission of data, at the request of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Upon request by UNMOVIC through the NMD, Iraq will allocate frequencies for communications equipment.

Iraq will provide security for all UNMOVIC and IAEA personnel. Secure and suitable accommodations will be designated at normal rates by Iraq for these personnel. For their part, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will require that their staff not stay at any accommodation other than those identified in consultation with Iraq.

On the use of fixed-wing aircraft for transport of personnel and equipment and for inspection purposes, it was clarified that aircraft used by UNMOVIC and IAEA staff arriving in Baghdad may land at Saddam International Airport. The points of departure of incoming aircraft will be decided by UNMOVIC. The Rasheed airbase will continue to be used for UNMOVIC and IAEA helicopter operations. UNMOVIC and Iraq will establish air liaison offices at the airbase. At both Saddam International Airport and Rasheed airbase, Iraq will provide the necessary support premises and facilities. Aircraft fuel will be provided by Iraq, as before, free of charge.

On the wider issue of air operations in Iraq, both fixed-wing and rotary, Iraq will guarantee the safety of air operations in its air space outside the no-fly zones. With regard to air operations in the no-fly zones, Iraq will take all steps within its control to ensure the safety of such operations.

Helicopter flights may be used, as needed, during inspections and for technical activities, such as gamma detection, without limitation in all parts of Iraq and without any area excluded. Helicopters may also be used for medical evacuation.

On the question of aerial imagery, UNMOVIC may wish to resume the use of U-2 or Mirage overflights. The relevant practical arrangements would be similar to those implemented in the past.

As before, visas for all arriving staff will be issued at the point of entry on the basis of the UN Laissez-Passer or UN Certificate; no other entry or exit formalities will be required. The aircraft passenger manifest will be provided one hour in advance of the arrival of the aircraft in Baghdad. There will be no searching of UNMOVIC or IAEA personnel or of official or personal baggage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will ensure that their personnel respect the laws of Iraq restricting the export of certain items, for example, those related to Iraq's national cultural heritage. UNMOVIC and the IAEA may bring into, and remove from, Iraq all of the items and materials they require, including satellite phones and other equipment. With respect to samples, UNMOVIC and IAEA will, where feasible, split samples so that Iraq may receive a portion while another portion is kept for reference purposes. Where appropriate, the organizations will send the samples to more than one laboratory for analysis.

We would appreciate your confirmation of the above as a correct reflection of our talks in Vienna.

Naturally, we may need other practical arrangements when proceeding with inspections. We would expect in such matters, as with the above, Iraq's co-operation in all respect.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)
Hans **Blix**
Executive Chairman
United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission


(Signed)
Mohamed **ElBaradei**
Director General
International Atomic Energy Agency

Innkomið skjal: Bréf

5. febrúar 2003

Málsnúmer	WAS02090019
Fyrirtæki/stofnun	Congress of the United States
Staðsetning	Committee on International Relations
Nafn	
Heimilisfang (1)	
Heimilisfang (2)	
Póstnúmer	
Póststaður	
Land	
Símanúmer	
Bréfasími	
Kennitala	
Skráð	

Tegund innkomins skjals	Bréf
Bréfalykill:	08.D.611
Efnisflokkur skjals:	Almennt
Dagsetning innkomins skjals:	30.01.2003
Staðsetning	Skjalasafn WAS
Sent til	
Efni	þakkarbréf



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Innkomið skjal


One Hundred Eighth Congress
Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

(202) 225-5021

http://www.house.gov/international_relations/

January 30, 2003

His Excellency Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Embassy of Iceland
1156 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005-1704



Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As we enter the decisive phase of the crisis forced upon us by Iraq's refusal to disarm, your government's solidarity with the United States is deeply appreciated in the Congress and by all Americans.

Your government's statements and actions underscore the enduring importance of the alliance between Europe and the United States, upon which rests the security of the West and the world as a whole. Our experience has taught us that the true measure of any ally is not the declarations issued during times of peace, but the response forthcoming during times of challenge.

We and our colleagues are heartened by your government's recognition that our countries share a common fate. We will not forget your determination to stand with us at this hour.

Sincerely,


HENRY J. HYDE
Chairman


TOM LANTOS
Ranking Member

Utanríkisráðuneytið

Minnisblað

Viðtakandi: **Utanríkisráðherra**
Sendandi: **Alþjóðaskrifstofa**
Dagsetning: **31. janúar 2003**
Málsnúmer: **UTN02080276**
Bréfalykill: **08.D.611; 09.V.611**

Efni: Bréf leiðtoga átta ríkja til stuðnings Bandaríkjunum vegna Íraks.

Hjálagt er bréf "áttmenninganna", sem birtist í fjölmiðlum í dag. Þar skora forsætisráðherrar átta Evrópuríkja (Bretland, Spánn, Danmörk, Portúgal, Ítalía, Pólland, Tékkland og Ungverjaland) á Sameinuðu þjóðirnar og öryggisráðið að sinna skyldum sínum og hvika hvergi í Íraksmálinu, trúverðugleiki stofnunarinnar sé í húfi. Í bréfinu er hvergi minnst á stuðning við einhliða aðgerðir Bandaríkjanna, komi til þeirra án íhlutunar Sp, einungis er reifaður almennur stuðningur við Bandaríkin sem ávallt verið hefur nánasti bandamaður Evrópuríkja. Ítrekað er að forða verði heimsbyggðinni frá þeirri ógn sem stafi af gjöreyðingarvopnum Saddam Husseins.

Ekki verður annað séð en íslensk stjórnvöld hefðu vel getað skrifað undir þessa yfirlýsingu leiðtoganna. Ráðuneyti er ókunnugt um að leitað hafi verið til annarra leiðtoga en þeirra er undirrituðu yfirlýsinguna (t.d. ekki haft samband við Íslendinga eða Norðmenn) að undanskildum Hollendingum sem ekki treystu sér til að skrifa undir. Þá voru hvorki Solana né Patten hjá Evrópusambandinu hafðir með í ráðum og hefur það vakið hörð viðbrögð frá Brussel. Grísku formennskunni var heldur ekki skemmt. Voru skilaboðin frá Brussel þau að yfirlýsing "áttmenninganna" græfi undan viðleitni sambandsins til að þróa sameiginlega utanríkisstefnu.

Sjá einnig hjálögð fréttaskeyti.

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EUROPEAN LEADERS CALL FOR EUROPE AND UNITED STATES TO STAND UNITED
(30/01/03)

**JOINT LETTER BY THE LEADERS OF EIGHT EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE
TIMES NEWSPAPER, THURSDAY 30 JANUARY 2003**

The real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law. These values crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create the USA. Today they are under greater threat than ever.

The attacks of 11 September showed just how far terrorists - the enemies of our common values - are prepared to go to destroy them. Those outrages were an attack on all of us. In standing firm in defence of these principles, the governments and people of the United States and Europe have amply demonstrated the strength of their convictions. Today more than ever, the transatlantic bond is a guarantee of our freedom.

We in Europe have a relationship with the United States which has stood the test of time. Thanks in large part to American bravery, generosity and far-sightedness, Europe was set free from the two forms of tyranny that devastated our continent in the 20th century: Nazism and Communism. Thanks, too, to the continued cooperation between Europe and the United States we have managed to guarantee peace and freedom on our continent. The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security.

In today's world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion. We know that success in the day-to-day battle against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction demands unwavering determination and firm international cohesion on the part of all countries for whom freedom is precious.

The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security. This danger has been explicitly recognised by the United Nations. All of us are bound by Security Council Resolution 1441, which was adopted unanimously. We Europeans have since reiterated our backing for Resolution 1441, our wish to pursue the UN route and our support for the Security Council, at the Prague Nato Summit and the Copenhagen European Council.

In doing so, we sent a clear, firm and unequivocal message that we would rid the world of the danger posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. We must remain united in insisting that his regime is disarmed. The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this peacefully. Our strength lies in unity.

The combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism is a threat of incalculable consequences. It is one at which all of us should feel concerned. Resolution 1441 is Saddam Hussein's last chance to disarm using peaceful means. The opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him. Sadly this week the UN weapons inspectors have confirmed that his long-established pattern of deception, denial and non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions is continuing.

Europe has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Indeed, they are the first victims of Iraq's current

brutal regime. Our goal is to safeguard world peace and security by ensuring that this regime gives up its weapons of mass destruction. Our governments have a common responsibility to face this threat. Failure to do so would be nothing less than negligent to our own citizens and to the wider world.

The United Nations Charter charges the Security Council with the task of preserving international peace and security. To do so, the Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolutions. We cannot allow a dictator to systematically violate those Resolutions. If they are not complied with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result.

We are confident that the Security Council will face up to its responsibilities.

José María Aznar, Spain

José Manuel Durão Barroso, Portugal

Silvio Berlusconi, Italy

Tony Blair, United Kingdom

Václav Havel, Czech Republic

Peter Medgyessy, Hungary

Leszek Miller, Poland

Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark

القائمة العربية

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30 January/Janvier 2003

IRAQ

New York: Eight European leaders, including British Prime Minister Tony Blair have written an opinion piece for today's Wall Street Journal supporting U.S. President George W. Bush's stance on Iraq. The United States said yesterday it was beginning a "final phase" of diplomatic consultations to gather support for more pressure on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to disarm in order to avoid war. In their letter in the Journal, which is signed by the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic, they said "the Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security." "We must remain united in insisting that his regime be disarmed," the op-ed piece said. "The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this peacefully." In their letter, the leaders said "the Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolutions." The group of leaders said if the resolutions are not complied with, "the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result." Bush will meet Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi today and close ally British Prime Minister Blair tomorrow. He will make telephone calls to world leaders and dispatch U.S. envoys abroad. Bush, preparing a possible strike against Iraq, has rejected arguments put forth by France and Germany that Iraq can be contained by letting U.N. weapons inspections proceed.

(Reuters)

Analysis

Dismay in Brussels at break in ranks

EU is further divided by 'gang of eight'

Ian Black in Brussels
Friday January 31, 2003
The Guardian

Europe's divisions over Iraq were cruelly exposed last night after Tony Blair and seven other leaders called on the entire continent to back the US in the battle to disarm Saddam Hussein.

Current EU members Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Denmark lined up with their counterparts from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - all joining the club next year - to close ranks with Washington.

The appeal by the so-called "gang of eight" was a carefully calculated snub to Germany and France, which are both leading EU opposition to war and blocking moves by Nato to give even limited military support to the US.

The eight bluntly reminded Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder that they had also signed up to UN resolution 1441, itself a victory for European attempts to keep the crisis on the multilateral track.

But last week France and Germany made clear they would seek to block military action against Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, the hawkish US defence secretary, then dismissed them as "old Europe".

Yesterday's appeal, orchestrated by Jose Maria Aznar, the centre-right Spanish prime minister, carefully melded old and new but conspicuously included only five of the EU's 15 current member states. Jan-Peter Balkenende, the Netherlands prime minister, was asked but refused to sign.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the first former communist countries to join Nato in 1999, are instinctively more pro-American than some older allies and will be fully fledged EU members in May 2004.

The message of the eight was that, despite strains, Europe and America have to continue to work together. "The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security," they wrote.

Only Germany has opposed military action under any circumstances, and is widely seen as having painted itself into a corner.

France, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Greece and Finland want to give the UN inspectors more time and insist on exploring all avenues for a peaceful solution.

If there is war, it is widely believed that France will eventually take part, as it did in 1991. Dominique de Villepin, its foreign minister, last night coolly described the "gang of eight" letter as "a contribution to the debate".

In Brussels, however, there was open dismay at this latest blow to the EU's attempts to speak with a single voice on the world stage.

Greece, the current holder of the union's rotating presidency, was not consulted. Nor were Chris Patten, the EU's external relations commissioner, or Javier Solana, its foreign policy chief.

Diplomats said the timing of the appeal was especially damaging, coming after EU foreign ministers went for a lowest common denominator approach to the crisis by demanding that Iraq disarm using the UN route. "In the context of Rumsfeld's attempts to divide Europeans into categories it is obviously unhelpful that separate statements are issued in this way," one senior official said.

Europe's poor performance and frustrated ambitions to be a global player have been intensely debated in the

convention on the future of Europe, which is drawing up a constitution for a union of 25 members. But proposed changes to current arrangements have fallen foul of disagreements, with Britain resisting attempts to give the supranational commission more powers in foreign policy.

The EU's grandly named "common foreign and security policy" was a "complete joke", admitted another senior Brussels figure.

Monday's foreign ministers' statement failed to address crucial questions about timing and possible military action, which is now almost certain to involve several European countries, even if only in a symbolic way.

The European split also remains highly damaging to Nato, where decision-making is paralysed because Germany and France, backed by Belgium and Luxembourg, are refusing to discuss a modest US request to provide anti-missile protection for Turkey, as well as Awacs surveillance planes, planning, ports, bases, airspace and refuelling facilities.

Failure to maintain unity on Iraq does not mean that the EU will never be able to act as one. Its policies in the Balkans, for example, are becoming increasingly coherent, while its fledgling rapid reaction force is about to take over peacekeeping in Macedonia from Nato and may assume an even bigger role in Bosnia.

But it is now painfully clear that over Iraq, the biggest international crisis for many years, the union is destined to sit on the sidelines - even though it will almost certainly be expected to help pay for the post-war reconstruction of the country.

The chairman of the European parliament's foreign affairs committee, Elmar Brok, complained last night that any chance of Europe's voice being heard had now been undone. "The race of the vassals has begun," he said.

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'Gang of eight' provokes EU rift

Michael White, Ian Black in Brussels and Patrick Wintour in Madrid

Friday January 31, 2003

The Guardian

Tony Blair yesterday triggered a serious dispute within the inner circles of the European Union when he sided with Jose Maria Aznar of Spain in a pro-American initiative over Iraq without consulting France or Germany.

As the prime minister set off for Madrid and Washington, Downing Street admitted that the eight-nation EU statement published yesterday, calling for Europe to stand united behind the US, had not been sent to all 15 member states because "they are in slightly different places" on the looming war with Baghdad.

The letter, which was initiated by Mr Aznar although its execution was shared with Mr Blair, prompted angry responses around key EU capitals, including Brussels.

"This is absolutely unnecessary," said one EU diplomat. "It is divisive. [Blair and Aznar] who have been tipped as future presidents of Europe should be more in touch with the mainstream of public opinion and other governments."

Officials in Brussels were horrified at this latest outbreak of disarray in EU ranks just days after foreign ministers agreed a policy of demanding that Iraq disarm, backing the UN route and supporting weapons inspectors.

Speaking after an hour-long meeting with Mr Aznar, the prime minister pleaded with his European partners to avoid allowing tensions with America to develop into an open rift. "The only people who will gain from Europe and America coming apart are those people who do not have the true interests of Europe or America at heart."

Mr Aznar repeatedly defended his joint article which was signed with Britain, Denmark, Italy and Portugal as well as three would-be members of the EU, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. He insisted it was in line with the EU statement on Iraq as well as the position adopted by Nato at its summit in Prague.

He was responding to criticism from Greece, holder of the EU presidency, which attacked the "gang of eight" for undermining unity. "The way in which the initiative was expressed does not contribute to a common approach," complained Costas Simitis, the prime minister.

The letter was seen as direct retaliation for the anti-war positions adopted by France and Germany. But Paris and Berlin yesterday sought to paper over divisions. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's office said the letter "stressed points" important to Berlin. Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, called it a "contribution to the debate."

Mr Blair's spokesman also made conciliatory noises: "The prime minister values enormously the positive relationship he has with President Chirac and Gerhard Schröder."

But Downing Street added that Mr Blair "equally values the relationship he has with other EU leaders. Clearly Europe is no longer six countries, it is 15, shortly to be 25."

Mr Chirac yesterday underlined the gulf between his sceptical stance on war and the Blair-Aznar axis by discussing with the Syrian leader Bashar Assad a plan to coordinate "the next stage to prevent the circumstances from reaching the point that may lead to the war on Iraq".

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Thursday, 30 January, 2003, 16:48 GMT

European leaders rally behind US

The heads of eight European states have issued a joint declaration of solidarity with the United States in its campaign to disarm Saddam Hussein.

Statement signatories

- Jose Maria Aznar, Spain
- Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, Portugal
- Silvio Berlusconi, Italy
- Tony Blair, United Kingdom
- Vaclav Havel, Czech Republic
- Peter Medgyessy, Hungary
- Leszek Miller, Poland
- Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark

In an apparent rebuff to France and Germany's opposition to military action, the leaders of Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic said the Iraqi president must not be allowed to violate UN resolutions.

The BBC's Ian Pannell in Washington says the statement gives substance to the Bush administration's stance that it is prepared to lead a "coalition of the willing" against Iraq without the backing of the UN if need be.

The signatories noted that they were "bound by [UN] Security Council Resolution 1441", which, they said, was "Saddam Hussein's last chance to disarm using peaceful means".

In a flurry of diplomatic activity over the crisis, President Bush will meet Italian Prime Minister on Friday, while UK Prime Minister Tony Blair will hold talks with the Spanish prime minister before joining Mr Bush in Camp David.

Old Europe rift

The Democrat opposition in the US has said it hopes Mr Blair will exert a restraining influence on Mr Bush.

KEY DATES

- 31 Jan - Bush meets Blair
- 5 Feb - Powell to address UN Security Council
- 14 Feb - Further report from weapons inspectors
- 27 Mar - Blix submits new report to UN

"I think that it is important.... that we take this very, very deliberately and cautiously and I hope that [Mr Blair] will express those words, of the need for precaution again as he comes to Washington," the Democrats' leader in the Senate, Tom Daschle, told the BBC.

The statement from the eight leaders said Europeans agreed that Saddam was a "clear threat to world security".

They declared that the world should ensure that the Iraqi regime is disarmed.

"The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this peacefully. Our strength lies in unity."

The statement of such strong support for the US and a "transatlantic relationship" is in sharp contrast to open differences between Washington and France and Germany.

US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently derided France and Germany as the "old Europe" after their leaders said they would work together to avoid war in Iraq.

France, which is a permanent member of the Security Council and could veto any resolution on military action, has said there should be more time to verify or find fault with Iraq's claims it has disarmed.

Russia - another permanent council member - has demanded that Washington provide "undeniable proof" that Iraq had illegal weapons of mass destruction.

Inspections under discussion

The head of the UN's nuclear weapons inspectors in Iraq, Mohamed ElBaradei, told the BBC that he could complete his inspections in a matter of months - if the Security Council allows them that much time.

"I believe in the next few months - four or five months - we should be able to come to a conclusion that Iraq is clean from nuclear weapons," he said.

But he said that Iraq had to show better co-operation.

"[The Iraqis] need to show quickly that there is a change of heart, that they are eager to be disarmed and not just be dragged into compliance.

"That psychological switch is key and if they make that transition I hope that we will have time to ensure Iraq's disarmament through inspections".

The Security Council is currently discussing a report by Mr ElBaradei and the chief inspector Hans Blix on the progress of their hunt for illegally held weapons.

Attention is now shifting towards 5 February when US Secretary of State Colin Powell is to present the Security Council with new evidence which President Bush says will back US assertions that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.

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Berist til : **Gunnar Snorri Gunnarsson, Stefán Skjaldarson**

Dags : **6. febrúar 2003** Tilvísun: **WAS02090019/08.D.611**

Efni: **Þakkarbréf bandarískra þingmanna**

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Helgi Ágústsson



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Embættiserindi

Móttakandi: **Utanríkisráðuneytið**

Berist til :

Dags : **6. febrúar 2003**

Tilvísun: **WAS02090019/08.D.611**

Efni: **Umfjöllun um ræðu Powells í öryggisráði Sameinuðu þjóðanna**

Meðfylgjandi sendist ráðuneyti til fróðleiks umfjöllun í Washington Post um ræðu bandaríska utanríkisráðherrans í öryggisráði Sameinuðu þjóðanna.

F.h.s.
Guðni Bragason

washingtonpost.com

Powell Lays Out Case Against Iraq

Evidence Shows Hussein Foiled Inspections, Secretary Tells U.N.

By Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, February 6, 2003; Page A01

UNITED NATIONS, Feb. 5 -- Secretary of State Colin L. Powell presented the U.N. Security Council today with satellite images, intercepted telephone conversations and information from Iraqi defectors in a bid to convince the American public and the world that new weapons inspections have failed to halt Iraq's banned weapons programs and that the hour was approaching for a decision on confronting President Saddam Hussein with force.

Speaking before a packed council chamber, Powell cited what he called an "accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior" to charge that Iraq does not intend to comply with last year's unanimous U.N. resolution giving Baghdad one last chance to disarm and to outline new alleged links between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network.

While inspections may continue for some weeks, Powell warned the council that the United Nations has little choice but to act in the face of such evidence of Iraqi behavior, in effect serving notice that the Bush administration has made up its mind and is ready to launch an invasion of Iraq to force Hussein from power with or without formal U.N. backing.

"This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately," Powell said.

As Powell addressed the Security Council, the Pentagon announced the mobilization of an additional 16,979 military reservists and National Guard members, bringing the total activated to 111,603, the largest number since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. And at Fort Campbell, Ky., the Army's 101st Airborne Division -- likely a key component of any Iraqi invasion -- stepped up preparations for what appeared to be an imminent deployment order.

In his nearly 90-minute address, Powell accused Iraq of constructing an elaborate deception scheme that enabled officials to conceal programs to produce biological weapons in mobile trucks and trains, to prohibited long-range missiles and to construct unmanned aerial vehicles capable of spreading biological or chemical agents over vast tracts of territory.

In an effort to broaden the indictment against Iraq, Powell also detailed new evidence of apparent links between Iraq and affiliates of al Qaeda. Powell noted that some of the ties may have a role in terrorist incidents in France, Britain, Spain and Russia -- all represented on the Security Council.

Iraq's U.N. ambassador, Mohamed Douri, was invited to attend the session and he dismissed Powell's assertions as "utterly unrelated to the truth."

"No new information was provided, mere sound recordings that cannot be ascertained as genuine," he said. "There are incorrect allegations, unnamed sources, unknown sources."

But Powell's statement, which was televised live to audiences around the world, appeared to generate

new support for the Bush administration within Congress, with even critics of President Bush's Iraq policy saying that Powell made a compelling case. Overseas, the reaction was more mixed. Powell's performance was widely praised, but many governments said he made a case for enhanced inspections, not war.

Powell also appeared to sway few minds on the Security Council.

Immediately after Powell spoke, the foreign ministers of France, Russia and China -- all of which hold veto power -- rejected the need for imminent military action and instead said the solution was more inspections. "Let us double, let us triple the number of inspectors. Let us open more regional offices. Let us go further than this," said French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin.

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, a vocal opponent of war, supported the French proposal to extend the inspections. But, he pointedly noted, Germany does not "hold any illusions on the inhuman and brutal nature of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. The regime is terrible for the Iraqi people." Fischer added that he lacked the technical expertise to assess whether the intelligence presented to the council by Powell was convincing.

In a statement sure to annoy the Germans, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, in testimony before Congress today, lumped Germany with Libya and Cuba as countries that have ruled out any role in a U.S.-led attack or postwar reconstruction of Iraq. "I believe Libya, Cuba and Germany are ones that have indicated they won't help in any respect, I believe," said Rumsfeld, who last month angered the German and French governments by referring to them as "old Europe."

The foreign ministers' council statements, however, had mostly been written before Powell spoke, and U.S. officials said afterward they believe the impact of Powell's presentation will become more apparent in the days ahead. Proponents of more inspections, officials said, will need to address the evidence of Iraqi deception outlined by Powell.

"The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction," Powell said. "But how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's noncompliance before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say: 'Enough. Enough.'"

One U.S. official noted with satisfaction that de Villepin, who two weeks ago threatened to veto an imminent military strike, today appeared to open the door to military action. "We rule out no option, including in the final analysis the recourse to force," he said.

After lunch, Powell raced through individual meetings with 11 foreign ministers whose countries are represented on the council, reinforcing the idea that the United Nations cannot wait much longer before acting. The United States has not committed itself to seeking a second U.N. resolution authorizing military action, but Powell's speech was designed to test the waters for whether it was possible to win approval for such a measure.

Powell may have picked up support from some of the smaller countries on the council. In the meetings with Powell, Angola was very supportive of the U.S. position, while Guinea said there were "no big gaps" between it and the United States, a U.S. official said. Spain, Bulgaria and Chile -- along with Britain, the closest U.S. ally -- also expressed support for a tough line on Iraq.

"We'll see what happens after the inspectors come back from Baghdad," Powell told reporters before departing for Washington. The chief weapons inspectors are scheduled to travel to the Iraqi capital this

weekend in an effort to seek more cooperation, and are due to report to the council again Feb. 14.

Powell is held in high esteem abroad, partly because of the perception that he is a reluctant warrior in an administration filled with hawks. Today, he used that reputation to bolster the administration's case. With CIA Director George J. Tenet seated behind him, Powell frequently emphasized that the facts he was presenting were his own conclusions from reviewing the intelligence.

Using large screens erected in the chamber, Powell displayed photographs, diagrams and translations from intercepts, moving quickly from the images and sounds to a detailed explanation of their meaning.

In one theatrical touch, he held up a vial with a teaspoon of simulated anthrax provided by the CIA. Less than a teaspoon of anthrax in an envelope, he noted, caused havoc in the U.S. postal system in 2001, and Iraq has not accounted for as much as 16,500 liters of anthrax, enough to "fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons."

A senior State Department official said that Powell spent Friday night, Saturday night and Sunday afternoon at CIA headquarters in Virginia, which is only minutes from Powell's home in McLean. He reviewed slides and transcripts and closely questioned photo and other intelligence analysts to understand how they reached their conclusions. Some pieces of intelligence were withheld to not compromise the sources of the information or the means by which it was gathered, the official said. Powell rejected some information if he felt it was too difficult for nonexperts to understand.

The official said Powell hoped to win over his audience by the wealth of information, saying he wanted to win like the 1963 Dodgers rather than the 1927 Yankees. "We hit a series of line drives, rather than go for a big out-of-the-park home run."

One senior council diplomat said Powell had delivered a skillful presentation of the risks posed by Iraq's weapons program. But he said that key elements, particularly the communications between Iraqi officials allegedly trying to hide nerve agents and mobile biological weapons facilities, were less convincing.

Syria, the Security Council's only Arab nation, said that there was nothing in Powell's remarks that would justify military action against Iraq. Syria's U.N. ambassador, Mikhail Wehbe, faulted the administration for creating a media spectacle in the council.

Powell said that intelligence sources had described an elaborate system of Iraqi concealment, replacing computer hard drives at weapons sites, and moving documents, computers and banned weapons around the country. He showed satellite photographs allegedly showing chemical weapons bunkers and convoys of Iraqi cargo trucks preparing to move ballistic missile components from a missile facility two days before inspections resumed. "We saw this kind of housecleaning at close to 30 sites," he said.

He acknowledged differences between the United States and the IAEA over the threat posed by Iraq's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. But he said "there is no doubt in my mind" that Iraq is seeking the ability to produce fissile nuclear fuel.

He also detailed new intelligence alleging that Iraq has been harboring the Baghdad cell of a global terrorist network run by Abu Musab Zarqawi, whom he described as an associate of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.

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Irrefutable

Thursday, February 6, 2003; Page A36

AFTER SECRETARY OF STATE Colin L. Powell's presentation to the United Nations Security Council yesterday, it is hard to imagine how anyone could doubt that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Powell left no room to argue seriously that Iraq has accepted the Security Council's offer of a "final opportunity" to disarm. And he offered a powerful new case that Saddam Hussein's regime is cooperating with a branch of the al Qaeda organization that is trying to acquire chemical weapons and stage attacks in Europe. Mr. Powell's evidence, including satellite photographs, audio recordings and reports from detainees and other informants, was overwhelming. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr., the senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, called it "powerful and irrefutable." Revealing those tapes and photographs had a cost, as Iraq will surely take countermeasures. But the decision to make so much evidence public will prove invaluable if it sways public opinion here and abroad. At a minimum, it will stand as a worthy last effort to engage the United Nations in facing a threat that the United States could, if necessary, address alone or with an ad-hoc coalition.

Whether Iraq is disarmed through the authority of the United Nations or whether the United States effectively assumes responsibility depends on how the Security Council responds. Though much of Mr. Powell's report was new to many Americans and Europeans, it probably did not surprise the governments that have most strongly opposed action in Iraq, including France and Germany. Diplomats from these nations do not dispute Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's assertion that "any country on the face of the Earth with an active intelligence program knows that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction." All supported Security Council Resolution 1441, which said a false statement by Iraq about its weapons, coupled with failure "at any time" to "cooperate fully" in disarmament, would be a "material breach" leading to "serious consequences." None say Iraq has complied. Until now, however, they have cynically argued that the inspectors must uncover evidence proving what they already know, or that it's too early to judge Saddam Hussein's cooperation. Mr. Powell's presentation stripped all credibility from that dodge.

France was ready with a fallback position yesterday. Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin acknowledged Iraq's defiance of the Security Council and the consequent failure of inspections and then argued that the world should respond by . . . dispatching more inspectors. This hardly qualifies as the "serious consequences" Paris formally endorsed on Nov. 8, but Mr. de Villepin argued, in effect, that a climb down is preferable to war. Indeed, war must always be a last resort, but the French solution offers no credible path to Iraqi disarmament. Twelve years of experience have demonstrated that it is impossible to strip an unwilling totalitarian government of its weapons by such means. As Mr. Powell asked, how could inspections ever determine which 18 of Iraq's tens of thousands of trucks carry mobile biological weapons labs? By choosing such a course, the Security Council would send Saddam Hussein the message that it remains the ineffectual body that shrank from enforcing 16 previous resolutions. By proposing it, France and those who support it are setting the stage for another momentous development they claim to oppose: the transfer of responsibility for countering the most serious threats to international security from multilateral institutions to the world's sole superpower.

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I'm Persuaded

By Mary McGrory

Thursday, February 6, 2003; Page A37

I don't know how the United Nations felt about Colin Powell's "*J'accuse*" speech against Saddam Hussein. I can only say that he persuaded me, and I was as tough as France to convince.

I'm not exactly a pacifist. Vietnam came close to making me one, but no one of the World War II generation can say war is never justified. I have resisted the push to war against Iraq because I thought George W. Bush was trying to pick a fight for all the wrong reasons -- big oil, the far right -- against the wrong enemy. The people who were pushing hardest are not people whose banner I could follow. I find our commander in chief a flighty thinker. The drumbeaters didn't inspire my confidence. All of them, despite their clamorous anticommunism, declined to wear the uniform for Vietnam, and some of them had the nerve, when the fighting was finally over, to write pieces for their neocon journals about how sorry they were to have missed the camaraderie of the foxhole and the firing line.

Richard Perle, a lead tenor in the war chorus, was the right hand of the late Henry Jackson, a hawk of hawks on defense issues. Gene McCarthy once remarked of Jackson, as a presidential candidate, "If he's elected, you will never see the sun -- the sky will be black with planes."

Among people I know, nobody was for the war. All of us were clinging tightly to the toga of Colin Powell. We, like the rest of the world, trusted him. We read Bob Woodward's "Bush at War" with admiration and gratitude for our stalwart secretary of state. We wished Powell would oppose the war, because it seemed like such a huge and misdirected overreaction to a bully who got on the nerves of our touchy Texas president. But resistance of any kind at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue was a boon to peaceniks. Powell patiently and humbly waited for his chance to convince the president that he couldn't have a shootout with Saddam Hussein and ride off into the sunset of world approval.

When the protest crowds came to Washington, full of scorn for the commander in chief and his Cabinet cohorts, they made an exception of Colin Powell.

Powellites had a bad moment when he lost his cool with the French ambassador to the United Nations. The French invited him to a seminar on terrorism, but when he got there he received an antiwar blast from Dominique de Villepin. State Department and White House spinners put it out that the secretary was "livid" and "humiliated," and soon the buzz was that Powell, in his rage, had gone pro-war. I was told to remember that Powell was above all "a good soldier" and, once a decision was made, would salute.

Was it appalling that a man of Powell's stature would be small enough to think that because he had lost face, thousands might lose their lives? I knew it was bigger than that. But on Iraq, the president has been generous in sharing his personal feelings.

Yet the key to Powell's sterner line came from an unexpected source: the long-suffering chief of what Bush chose to call "the so-called inspectors": Hans Blix. In a progress report on Jan. 21, Blix castigated Hussein for having "no genuine acceptance of the demand to disarm" and for "a failure to demonstrate active cooperation with inspection."

Of course, Bush chose Powell to make the case before the United Nations. He has no one else who so commands the country's respect -- or the world's.

Powell took his seat in the United Nations and put his shoulder to the wheel. He was to talk for almost an hour and a half. His voice was strong and unwavering. He made his case without histrionics of any kind, with no verbal embellishments. He aired his tapes of conversations between Iraqi army officers who might well be supposed to be concealing toxic materials or enterprises.

He talked of the mobile factories concealed in trains and trucks that move along roads and rails while manufacturing biological agents. I was struck by their ingenuity and the insistence on manufacturing agents that cause diseases such as gangrene, plague, cholera, camelpox and hemorrhagic fever.

Would Saddam Hussein use them? He already has, against his own people and Iranians. He has produced four tons of deadly VX: "A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes." The cumulative effect was stunning. I was reminded of the day long ago when John Dean, a White House toady, unloaded on Richard Nixon and you could see the dismay written on Republican faces that knew impeachment was inevitable.

I wasn't so sure about the al Qaeda connection. But I had heard enough to know that Saddam Hussein, with his stockpiles of nerve gas and death-dealing chemicals, is more of a menace than I had thought. I'm not ready for war yet. But Colin Powell has convinced me that it might be the only way to stop a fiend, and that if we do go, there is reason.

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Disregarding the Deniers

By George F. Will

Thursday, February 6, 2003; Page A37

In estimating the impact of Colin Powell's U.N. presentation on persons who believe that there is no justification for a military response to Iraq's behavior, remember the human capacity for willful suspension of disbelief. Remember this: People determined to believe that a vast conspiracy assassinated President Kennedy believe that the absence of evidence of the conspiracy *proves* the vastness and cleverness of the conspiracy.

People committed to a particular conclusion will get to it and will stay there. So the facts that Powell deployed, and the pattern they form, will not persuade people determined to be unpersuaded. But Powell's presentation, its power enhanced by his avoidance of histrionics, will change all minds open to evidence.

Thus it will justify disregarding the presumptively close-minded people who persist in denying . . . what? What *are* people denying who still deny the need for force? That Iraq has weapons of mass destruction? Or that Iraq is resisting the inspections? No, they are denying only that force is needed. They say an enhanced presence of inspectors will paralyze Iraq's weapons programs.

Speaking, as we are, primarily of the French government, its oleaginous foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, addressed the Security Council after Powell. After some initial circumlocutions, the opacity of which could not conceal their offensiveness, de Villepin may have begun exercising the skill France has often honed since 1870 -- that of retreating, this time into incoherence.

After dismissing Powell's photographs and voice intercepts as "information, indications, questions, which deserve further exploration," de Villepin declared: "It will be up to the inspectors to assess the facts as is stated in Resolution 1441." Such cheek. De Villepin put Powell through torturous word-by-word negotiation of 1441 and knows that it does not contain what he, de Villepin, now purports to find in it. It does not vest in Hans Blix's minions the sovereign power to declare for the United Nations whether Iraq is in material breach.

Perhaps de Villepin's statement lost some clarity in translation. More likely, it was incoherent because his position is.

He said "the disarmament of Iraq" is "a clear objective which we cannot compromise." He said inspections require Iraq's "active cooperation." Then, although Powell's evidence was still fresh in the minds of the Security Council members, de Villepin said "this cooperation still contains some gray areas." Gray, indeed.

Three paragraphs after saying the inspections "are working," de Villepin said the inspectors have encountered "real difficulties." Three paragraphs later, insincerity producing stammering, he said, "Our evidence suggests -- the evidence suggests that there are significant stocks -- there is the possible possession of significant stocks of anthrax and botulism toxins and the possible -- possibly a production capacity today." But in the next paragraph he said, so what? "The absence of long-range delivery systems reduces the potential threat of these weapons" -- as though ballistic missiles are necessary.

Concluding with cascading billows of fog about "a collective demarche of responsibility by the international community," de Villepin proposed using "some unused space in Resolution 1441" by "decisive reinforcement" of the inspections, tripling the number of inspectors (to all of 300 for an uncooperative nation the size of California) and opening regional offices. In a flourish that defies satire, de Villepin called for Iraq to pass "legislation" prohibiting itself from manufacturing prohibited weapons.

De Villepin having deflated the French reputation for deft diplomacy, we are left with the stark fact that Iraq is demonstrating contempt for U.N. Resolution 1441 and for the United Nations itself. If the United Nations' supine response is to prolong the inspection charade in a futile attempt to stymie U.S. force, the United Nations will demonstrate contempt for 1441 and hence for its own pretense of moral authority and practical utility.

It is probable that President Bush decided at least a year ago that U.S. force would be necessary, and would be used, for regime change in Iraq, with or without U.N. approval. The United Nations was warned by the president in last month's State of the Union address: "The course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."

But the president would find it more difficult to wage preemptive war without the coloration of international legality, which the United Nations supposedly incarnates. So an irony stands out:

It would be more difficult for the president to wage war against Iraq if the United Nations did not exist. But if the United Nations, having passed 1441, now refuses to authorize war, the United Nations will essentially cease to exist.

There is the outline of a satisfactory outcome: Saddam Hussein removed, the United Nations reduced.

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An Old Trooper's Smoking Gun

By Jim Hoagland

Thursday, February 6, 2003; Page A37

Colin Powell did more than present the world with a convincing and detailed X-ray of Iraq's secret weapons and terrorism programs yesterday. He also exposed the enduring bad faith of several key members of the U.N. Security Council when it comes to Iraq and its "web of lies," in Powell's phrase.

China's foreign minister set an intellectually corrupt tone that pervaded other formal reactions to Powell's startling 90-plus minutes of inconvenient truths. Tang Jiaxuan listened impassively and then read every word of his "response" from a statement that had obviously been prepared long before Powell spoke. He seemed intent on undercutting the U.S. case that the Iraqis have systematically sabotaged the inspectors while promising cooperation.

No evidence that Powell could have offered in New York would have altered China's view at this meeting. Beijing was mesmerized by political considerations seemingly more important than the secretary of state's masterful indictment, which displayed sensitive U.S. intelligence and logic that I found irrefutable.

The none-so-blind award of the session was claimed by Russia's Igor Ivanov, a recovering Soviet apparatchik. Powell, no stranger to conducting high-powered briefings, deftly walked the council through the Iraqi maze of obstruction. He documented how Saddam Hussein's "higher committee for monitoring the inspections teams" had beaten the inspections game by systematically hiding and destroying evidence at specific sites Powell named.

The Russian response? Turn that same evidence over to the inspectors (bugged and spied upon by the Iraqis) and send them back to the same sites. When they still find nothing, Ivanov will presumably nominate Saddam Hussein for the Nobel Peace Prize.

But this does not mean that Powell should have skipped going to the Security Council or that President Bush's determination will not gradually move many of the doubters. Powell completed the case that Bush began with his Sept. 12 U.N. speech: If war comes, it will come because of the weakness and self-willed blindness of a Security Council that will go down in history as having destroyed the United Nations' credibility and effectiveness.

Consider the clever statement by Dominique de Villepin, who began with the same obstructionist rhetoric that France has been putting out for several weeks. But he then reestablished the more balanced approach Paris had previously pursued. The minister demanded immediate Iraqi cooperation as a condition for his consciously meaningless plan of greatly expanded inspections. Even the French lack the courage of their cynicism when the United States makes it clear that there is no going back.

Powell did just that yesterday. Here was the administration's leading dove on Iraq releasing communications intercepts, highly secret "product" from interrogations of Iraqi defectors and terrorist prisoners, and detailed intelligence interpretations of satellite photos. Sitting behind him to put a visible stamp of approval on every word Powell spoke was the director of central intelligence, George Tenet.

Powell and the CIA have come in for criticism in this column over the past two years for seeming to misjudge the dangers of Saddam Hussein's drive for weapons of mass destruction and Iraq's support for international terrorism and its links to al Qaeda in particular. But the secretary and the spies assembled as powerful a case as the most exacting critic could expect and backed it up impressively yesterday.

Speaking as "an old trooper," the ex-general showed, through technical detail, the illogic of Iraq's protestations that it has been importing aluminum tubing for short-range rockets and not for nuclear weapons. Nobody uses this kind of tubing for rockets, Powell said convincingly. He then made the obvious point that so many are intent on rushing past: In any event, the act of importing this specific tubing -- for any purpose whatever -- is illegal and further proof of Iraq's deliberate and material breach of sanctions and U.N. resolutions. How is that not a smoking gun?

The foreign ministers, U.N. senior officials and others in the Security Council chamber yesterday did get there by being dummies. They already knew the grand outline of the evils and dangers that Powell was describing in compelling detail. They have been following the familiar pattern of reasoning backward -- of determining the political outcome they desire first and then choosing or ignoring the facts that fit that outcome.

Powell has made that callous approach much more difficult for them and for all others who have claimed not to see the threat that Saddam Hussein and his terrorist henchmen have become to international order, the United Nations and American citizens.

To continue to say that the Bush administration has not made its case, you must now believe that Colin Powell lied in the most serious statement he will ever make, or was taken in by manufactured evidence. I don't believe that. Today, neither should you.

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A Winning Hand for Powell

By Richard Cohen

Thursday, February 6, 2003; Page A37

It is time once again to quote my favorite philosopher -- Tevye, the lead character from "Fiddler on the Roof." It was his habit to weigh his options by saying, "On the one hand, " and then, "On the other hand," until he confronted a situation where there was no other hand. This is where Colin Powell brought us all yesterday.

The evidence he presented to the United Nations -- some of it circumstantial, some of it absolutely bone-chilling in its detail -- had to prove to anyone that Iraq not only hasn't accounted for its weapons of mass destruction but without a doubt still retains them. Only a fool -- or possibly a Frenchman -- could conclude otherwise.

The clincher, as it had to be, was not a single satellite photo or the intercept of one Iraqi official talking to another. And it was not, as it never could be, the assertion that some spy or Iraqi deserter had made this or that charge -- because, of course, who can prove any of that? It was the totality of the material and the fact that Powell himself had presented it. In this case, the messenger may have been more important than the message.

This time, for instance, when the by-now hoary charge was made that a link existed between al Qaeda and Baghdad, it was Powell who made it -- and it hit with force. This time, when it was said that Iraq had developed unmanned airplanes that could dispense chemical or biological agents, it was Powell who made the charge -- and showed a picture of one. This time, the finger-pointer was the man who, heretofore, had been accused of what in the Bush administration is a virtual slander: prudence. Here was a reasonable man making a reasonable case.

To my mind, Powell's most compelling statements came when he acknowledged doubt or differences of opinion. He did so when discussing Iraq's importation of aluminum tubes that Baghdad may -- or may not -- be using as centrifuges for enriching uranium.

"By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion," he said. "There is controversy about what these tubes are for." You bet, and saying so enhanced his credibility.

If Powell failed in any area it was in proving that Iraq has a nuclear weapons program that poses an imminent -- or even proximate -- threat. That appears not to be the case. Its program seems no different from those of many other nations -- although its ultimate intentions are a far different story. If it could get fissionable material it would undoubtedly make a bomb. But it's apparently not at that point yet -- or even close to it. (It's almost impossible to hide a true nuclear weapons program.)

This is not a minor point. The Bush administration consistently cited the Iraqi nuclear weapons program as the ultimate reason to change the regime in Baghdad. It seemed then -- and it seems now -- an exaggeration. It has cost the administration some credibility.

But the case Powell laid out regarding chemical and biological weapons was so strong -- so convincing -

- it hardly mattered that nukes may be years away, and thank God for that. In effect, he was telling the French and the Russians what could happen -- what would happen -- if the United Nations did not do what it said it would and hold Saddam Hussein accountable for, in effect, being Saddam Hussein.

The French, though, are so far deaf to such logic. Their foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, said that the consequences of war are dire and unpredictable. He is right about that. But the consequences of doing nothing -- and mere containment of Iraq amounts to nothing -- are also dire and somewhat predictable. The United Nations will be revealed as a toothless debating society -- a duty-free store on the East River -- and every rogue will have learned a lesson from Saddam Hussein: Stall until everyone loses interest.

North Korea probably already has nuclear bombs. Iran may have a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan has the bomb, India and China too. All kinds of states -- stable, unstable and just plain nutty -- are making weapons of mass destruction. Pretty soon, any collection of fanatics with a chemistry set will pose a horrific threat. The world is steadily becoming less and less secure. Now is not the time for the United Nations to flinch.

As with Tevye, there is no "other hand" when it comes to Iraq. If anyone had any doubt, Powell proved that it has defied international law -- not to mention international norms concerning human rights -- and virtually dared the United Nations to put up or shut up. There is no other hand. There is no choice.

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'A Policy of Evasion and Deception'

eMediaMillWorks
Wednesday, February 5, 2003



Following is the full text of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the United Nations on Iraq.

POWELL: Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, I would like to begin by expressing my thanks for the special effort that each of you made to be here today.

This is important day for us all as we review the situation with respect to Iraq and its disarmament obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441.

Last November 8, this council passed Resolution 1441 by a unanimous vote. The purpose of that resolution was to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. Iraq had already been found guilty of material breach of its obligations, stretching back over 16 previous resolutions and 12 years.

Resolution 1441 was not dealing with an innocent party, but a regime this council has repeatedly convicted over the years. Resolution 1441 gave Iraq one last chance, one last chance to come into compliance or to face serious consequences. No council member present in voting on that day had any allusions about the nature and intent of the resolution or what serious consequences meant if Iraq did not comply.

And to assist in its disarmament, we called on Iraq to cooperate with returning inspectors from UNMOVIC and IAEA.

CONFRONTING IRAQ

SPECIAL REPORT

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We laid down tough standards for Iraq to meet to allow the inspectors to do their job. This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the inspectors to find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors; they are not detectives.

I asked for this session today for two purposes: First, to support the core assessments made by Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. As Dr. Blix reported to this council on January 27th, quote, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it," unquote.

And as Dr. ElBaradei reported, Iraq's declaration of December 7, quote, "did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998." My second purpose today is to provide you with additional information, to share with you what the United States knows about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as well as Iraq's involvement in terrorism, which is also the subject of Resolution 1441 and other earlier resolutions.

I might add at this point that we are providing all relevant information we can to the inspection teams for them to do their work.

The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources. And some are those of other countries. Some of the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.

I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling. What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior. The facts on Iraq's behavior--Iraq's behavior demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort--no effort--to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.

Let me begin by playing a tape for you. What you're about to hear is a conversation that my government monitored. It takes place on November 26 of last year, on the day before United Nations teams resumed inspections in Iraq.

The conversation involves two senior officers, a colonel and a brigadier general, from Iraq's elite military unit, the Republican Guard. Let me pause and review some of the key elements of this conversation that you just heard between these two officers.

First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohamed ElBaradei, is

coming, and they know what he's coming for, and they know he's coming the next day. He's coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things.

But they're worried. ``We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it?"

What is their concern? Their concern is that it's something they should not have, something that should not be seen.

The general is incredulous: ``You didn't get a modified. You don't have one of those, do you?"

``I have one."

``Which, from where?"

``From the workshop, from the Al Kendi (ph) Company?"

``What?"

``From Al Kendi (ph)."

``I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried. You all have something left."

``We evacuated everything. We don't have anything left."

Note what he says: ``We evacuated everything."

We didn't destroy it. We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up.

``I will come to you tomorrow."

The Al Kendi (ph) Company: This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity. Let me play another tape for you. As you will recall, the inspectors found 12 empty chemical warheads on January 16. On January 20, four days later, Iraq promised the inspectors it would search for more. You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters issuing an instruction to an officer in the field. Their conversation took place just last week on January 30.

(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE)

1/8Speaking in Arabic. 3/8

(END AUDIO TAPE)

POWELL: Let me pause again and review the elements of this message.

``They're inspecting the ammunition you have, yes."

``Yes."

``For the possibility there are forbidden ammo."

``For the possibility there is by chance forbidden ammo?"

``Yes."

``And we sent you a message yesterday to clean out all of the areas, the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there." Remember the first message, evacuated. This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind.

If you go a little further into this message, and you see the specific instructions from headquarters: ``After you have carried out what is contained in this message, destroy the message because I don't want anyone to see this message."

``OK, OK."

Why? Why?

This message would have verified to the inspectors that they have been trying to turn over things. They were looking for things. But they don't want that message seen, because they were trying to clean up the area to leave no evidence behind of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. And they can claim that nothing was there. And the inspectors can look all they want, and they will find nothing.

This effort to hide things from the inspectors is not one or two isolated events, quite the contrary. This is part and parcel of a policy of evasion and deception that goes back 12 years, a policy set at the highest levels of the Iraqi regime.

We know that Saddam Hussein has what is called quote, ``a higher committee for monitoring the inspections teams," unquote. Think about that. Iraq has a high-level committee to monitor the inspectors who were sent in to monitor Iraq's disarmament. Not to cooperate with them, not to assist them, but to spy on them and keep them from doing their jobs.

The committee reports directly to Saddam Hussein. It is headed by Iraq's vice president, Taha Yassin Ramadan. Its members include Saddam Hussein's son Qusay.

This committee also includes Lieutenant General Amir al-Saadi, an adviser to Saddam. In case that name isn't immediately familiar to you, General Saadi has been the Iraqi regime's primary point of contact for Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It was General Saadi who last fall publicly pledged that Iraq was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with inspectors. Quite the contrary, Saadi's job is not to cooperate, it is to deceive; not to disarm, but to undermine the inspectors; not to support them, but to frustrate them and to make sure they learn nothing.

We have learned a lot about the work of this special committee. We learned that just prior to the return of inspectors last November the regime had decided to resume what we heard called, quote, "the old game of cat and mouse," unquote.

For example, let me focus on the now famous declaration that Iraq submitted to this council on December 7. Iraq never had any intention of complying with this council's mandate. Instead, Iraq planned to use the declaration, overwhelm us and to overwhelm the inspectors with useless information about Iraq's permitted weapons so that we would not have time to pursue Iraq's prohibited weapons. Iraq's goal was to give us, in this room, to give those of us on this council the false impression that the inspection process was working.

You saw the result. Dr. Blix pronounced the 12,200-page declaration, rich in volume, but poor in information and practically devoid of new evidence.

Could any member of this council honestly rise in defense of this false declaration?

Everything we have seen and heard indicates that, instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing.

My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.

Orders were issued to Iraq's security organizations, as well as to Saddam Hussein's own office, to hide all correspondence with the Organization of Military Industrialization. This is the organization that oversees Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Make sure there are no documents left which could connect you to the OMI.

We know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key

files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection.

Thanks to intelligence they were provided, the inspectors recently found dramatic confirmation of these reports. When they searched the home of an Iraqi nuclear scientist, they uncovered roughly 2,000 pages of documents. You see them here being brought out of the home and placed in U.N. hands. Some of the material is classified and related to Iraq's nuclear program.

Tell me, answer me, are the inspectors to search the house of every government official, every Baath Party member and every scientist in the country to find the truth, to get the information they need, to satisfy the demands of our council?

Our sources tell us that, in some cases, the hard drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives. Where did they go? What's being hidden? Why? There's only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors.

Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving, not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction to keep them from being found by inspectors. While we were here in this council chamber debating Resolution 1441 last fall, we know, we know from sources that a missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations, distributing them to various locations in western Iraq. Most of the launchers and warheads have been hidden in large groves of palm trees and were to be moved every one to four weeks to escape detection.

We also have satellite photos that indicate that banned materials have recently been moved from a number of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction facilities.

Let me say a word about satellite images before I show a couple. The photos that I am about to show you are sometimes hard for the average person to interpret, hard for me. The painstaking work of photo analysis takes experts with years and years of experience, pouring for hours and hours over light tables. But as I show you these images, I will try to capture and explain what they mean, what they indicate to our imagery specialists.

Let's look at one. This one is about a weapons munition facility, a facility that holds ammunition at a place called Taji (ph). This is one of about 65 such facilities in Iraq. We know that this one has housed chemical munitions. In fact, this is where the Iraqis recently came up with the additional four chemical weapon shells.

Here, you see 15 munitions bunkers in yellow and red outlines. The four

that are in red squares represent active chemical munitions bunkers.

How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions. The arrow at the top that says security points to a facility that is the signature item for this kind of bunker. Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come out of the bunker. The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong.

This is characteristic of those four bunkers. The special security facility and the decontamination vehicle will be in the area, if not at any one of them or one of the other, it is moving around those four, and it moves as it needed to move, as people are working in the different bunkers.

Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone, it's been cleaned up, and it was done on the 22nd of December, as the U.N. inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right.

The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing.

This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji (ph). As it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our sources, we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and electronics. I would call my colleagues attention to the fine paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.

In this next example, you will see the type of concealment activity Iraq has undertaken in response to the resumption of inspections. Indeed, in November 2002, just when the inspections were about to resume this type of activity spiked. Here are three examples.

At this ballistic missile site, on November 10, we saw a cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components. At this biological weapons related facility, on November 25, just two days before inspections resumed, this truck caravan appeared, something we almost never see at this facility, and we monitor it carefully and regularly.

At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared along with the truck-mounted

crane to move missiles. We saw this kind of house cleaning at close to 30 sites.

Days after this activity, the vehicles and the equipment that I've just highlighted disappear and the site returns to patterns of normalcy. We don't know precisely what Iraq was moving, but the inspectors already knew about these sites, so Iraq knew that they would be coming.

We must ask ourselves: Why would Iraq suddenly move equipment of this nature before inspections if they were anxious to demonstrate what they had or did not have?

Remember the first intercept in which two Iraqis talked about the need to hide a modified vehicle from the inspectors. Where did Iraq take all of this equipment? Why wasn't it presented to the inspectors?

Iraq also has refused to permit any U-2 reconnaissance flights that would give the inspectors a better sense of what's being moved before, during and after inspections.

This refusal to allow this kind of reconnaissance is in direct, specific violation of operative paragraph seven of our Resolution 1441.

Saddam Hussein and his regime are not just trying to conceal weapons, they're also trying to hide people. You know the basic facts. Iraq has not complied with its obligation to allow immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted and private access to all officials and other persons as required by Resolution 1441.

The regime only allows interviews with inspectors in the presence of an Iraqi official, a minder. The official Iraqi organization charged with facilitating inspections announced, announced publicly and announced ominously that, quote, "Nobody is ready to leave Iraq to be interviewed."

Iraqi Vice President Ramadan accused the inspectors of conducting espionage, a veiled threat that anyone cooperating with U.N. inspectors was committing treason.

Iraq did not meet its obligations under 1441 to provide a comprehensive list of scientists associated with its weapons of mass destruction programs. Iraq's list was out of date and contained only about 500 names, despite the fact that UNSCOM had earlier put together a list of about 3,500 names.

Let me just tell you what a number of human sources have told us.

Saddam Hussein has directly participated in the effort to prevent interviews. In early December, Saddam Hussein had all Iraqi scientists warned of the serious consequences that they and their families would

face if they revealed any sensitive information to the inspectors. They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is punishable by death.

Saddam Hussein also said that scientists should be told not to agree to leave Iraq; anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy. This violates 1441.

In mid-November, just before the inspectors returned, Iraqi experts were ordered to report to the headquarters of the special security organization to receive counterintelligence training. The training focused on evasion methods, interrogation resistance techniques, and how to mislead inspectors.

Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts, corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries.

For example, in mid-December weapons experts at one facility were replaced by Iraqi intelligence agents who were to deceive inspectors about the work that was being done there. On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent into hiding.

In the middle of January, experts at one facility that was related to weapons of mass destruction, those experts had been ordered to stay home from work to avoid the inspectors. Workers from other Iraqi military facilities not engaged in illicit weapons projects were to replace the workers who'd been sent home. A dozen experts have been placed under house arrest, not in their own houses, but as a group at one of Saddam Hussein's guest houses. It goes on and on and on.

As the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors in direct violation of Resolution 1441. The pattern is not just one of reluctant cooperation, nor is it merely a lack of cooperation. What we see is a deliberate campaign to prevent any meaningful inspection work.

My colleagues, operative paragraph four of U.N. Resolution 1441, which we lingered over so long last fall, clearly states that false statements and omissions in the declaration and a failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and cooperate fully in the implementation of this resolution shall constitute--the facts speak for themselves--shall constitute a further material breach of its obligation. We wrote it this way to give Iraq an early test--to give Iraq an early test. Would they give an honest declaration and would they early on indicate a willingness to cooperate with the inspectors? It was designed to be an early test.

They failed that test. By this standard, the standard of this operative paragraph, I believe that Iraq is now in further material breach of its obligations. I believe this conclusion is irrefutable and undeniable.

Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in U.N. Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.

The issue before us is not how much time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction. But how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's noncompliance before we, as a council, we, as the United Nations, say: "Enough. Enough."

The gravity of this moment is matched by the gravity of the threat that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction pose to the world. Let me now turn to those deadly weapons programs and describe why they are real and present dangers to the region and to the world.

First, biological weapons. We have talked frequently here about biological weapons. By way of introduction and history, I think there are just three quick points I need to make.

First, you will recall that it took UNSCOM four long and frustrating years to pry--to pry--an admission out of Iraq that it had biological weapons.

Second, when Iraq finally admitted having these weapons in 1995, the quantities were vast. Less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax, a little bit about this amount--this is just about the amount of a teaspoon--less than a teaspoon full of dry anthrax in an envelope shutdown the United States Senate in the fall of 2001. This forced several hundred people to undergo emergency medical treatment and killed two postal workers just from an amount just about this quantity that was inside of an envelope. Iraq declared 8,500 liters of anthrax, but UNSCOM estimates that Saddam Hussein could have produced 25,000 liters. If concentrated into this dry form, this amount would be enough to fill tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of teaspoons. And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon-full of this deadly material.

And that is my third point. And it is key. The Iraqis have never accounted for all of the biological weapons they admitted they had and we know they had. They have never accounted for all the organic material used to make them. And they have not accounted for many of the weapons filled with these agents such as there are 400 bombs. This is evidence, not conjecture. This is true. This is all well-documented.

Dr. Blix told this council that Iraq has provided little evidence to verify anthrax production and no convincing evidence of its destruction. It should come as no shock then, that since Saddam Hussein forced out the

last inspectors in 1998, we have amassed much intelligence indicating that Iraq is continuing to make these weapons.

One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. Let me take you inside that intelligence file and share with you what we know from eye witness accounts. We have firsthand descriptions of biological weapons factories on wheels and on rails.

The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.

Although Iraq's mobile production program began in the mid-1990s, U.N. inspectors at the time only had vague hints of such programs. Confirmation came later, in the year 2000.

The source was an eye witness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998. Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents.

He reported that when UNSCOM was in country and inspecting, the biological weapons agent production always began on Thursdays at midnight because Iraq thought UNSCOM would not inspect on the Muslim Holy Day, Thursday night through Friday. He added that this was important because the units could not be broken down in the middle of a production run, which had to be completed by Friday evening before the inspectors might arrive again.

This defector is currently hiding in another country with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him. His eye-witness account of these mobile production facilities has been corroborated by other sources.

A second source, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position to know the details of the program, confirmed the existence of transportable facilities moving on trailers.

A third source, also in a position to know, reported in summer 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems mounted on road trailer units and on rail cars.

Finally, a fourth source, an Iraqi major, who defected, confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research laboratories, in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier. We have diagrammed what our sources reported about these mobile facilities. Here you see both truck

and rail car-mounted mobile factories. The description our sources gave us of the technical features required by such facilities are highly detailed and extremely accurate. As these drawings based on their description show, we know what the fermenters look like, we know what the tanks, pumps, compressors and other parts look like. We know how they fit together. We know how they work. And we know a great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted.

As shown in this diagram, these factories can be concealed easily, either by moving ordinary-looking trucks and rail cars along Iraq's thousands of miles of highway or track, or by parking them in a garage or warehouse or somewhere in Iraq's extensive system of underground tunnels and bunkers.

We know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological agent factories. The truck-mounted ones have at least two or three trucks each. That means that the mobile production facilities are very few, perhaps 18 trucks that we know of--there may be more--but perhaps 18 that we know of. Just imagine trying to find 18 trucks among the thousands and thousands of trucks that travel the roads of Iraq every single day.

It took the inspectors four years to find out that Iraq was making biological agents. How long do you think it will take the inspectors to find even one of these 18 trucks without Iraq coming forward, as they are supposed to, with the information about these kinds of capabilities?

Ladies and gentlemen, these are sophisticated facilities. For example, they can produce anthrax and botulinum toxin. In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. And dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings.

By 1998, U.N. experts agreed that the Iraqis had perfected drying techniques for their biological weapons programs. Now, Iraq has incorporated this drying expertise into these mobile production facilities.

We know from Iraq's past admissions that it has successfully weaponized not only anthrax, but also other biological agents, including botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

But Iraq's research efforts did not stop there. Saddam Hussein has investigated dozens of biological agents causing diseases such as gas gangrene, plague, typhus (ph), tetanus, cholera, camelpox and hemorrhagic fever, and he also has the wherewithal to develop smallpox.

The Iraqi regime has also developed ways to disburse lethal biological agents, widely and discriminately into the water supply, into the air. For example, Iraq had a program to modify aerial fuel tanks for Mirage jets. This video of an Iraqi test flight obtained by UNSCOM some years ago shows an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet aircraft. Note the spray coming from

beneath the Mirage; that is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying.

In 1995, an Iraqi military officer, Mujahid Sali Abdul Latif (ph), told inspectors that Iraq intended the spray tanks to be mounted onto a MiG-21 that had been converted into an unmanned aerial vehicle, or a UAV. UAVs outfitted with spray tanks constitute an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons. Iraq admitted to producing four spray tanks. But to this day, it has provided no credible evidence that they were destroyed, evidence that was required by the international community.

There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly produce more, many more. And he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction. If biological weapons seem too terrible to contemplate, chemical weapons are equally chilling.

UNMOVIC already laid out much of this, and it is documented for all of us to read in UNSCOM's 1999 report on the subject.

Let me set the stage with three key points that all of us need to keep in mind: First, Saddam Hussein has used these horrific weapons on another country and on his own people. In fact, in the history of chemical warfare, no country has had more battlefield experience with chemical weapons since World War I than Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Second, as with biological weapons, Saddam Hussein has never accounted for vast amounts of chemical weaponry: 550 artillery shells with mustard, 30,000 empty munitions and enough precursors to increase his stockpile to as much as 500 tons of chemical agents. If we consider just one category of missing weaponry--6,500 bombs from the Iran-Iraq war--UNMOVIC says the amount of chemical agent in them would be in the order of 1,000 tons. These quantities of chemical weapons are now unaccounted for.

Dr. Blix has quipped that, quote, ``Mustard gas is not (inaudible) You are supposed to know what you did with it."

We believe Saddam Hussein knows what he did with it, and he has not come clean with the international community. We have evidence these weapons existed. What we don't have is evidence from Iraq that they have been destroyed or where they are. That is what we are still waiting for.

Third point, Iraq's record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced four tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons.

The admission only came out after inspectors collected documentation as a result of the defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam Hussein's late son-in-law. UNSCOM also gained forensic evidence that Iraq had produced VX and put it into weapons for delivery. Yet, to this day, Iraq denies it had ever weaponized VX. And on January 27, UNMOVIC told this council that it has information that conflicts with the Iraqi account of its VX program.

We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry. To all outward appearances, even to experts, the infrastructure looks like an ordinary civilian operation. Illicit and legitimate production can go on simultaneously; or, on a dime, this dual-use infrastructure can turn from clandestine to commercial and then back again.

These inspections would be unlikely, any inspections of such facilities would be unlikely to turn up anything prohibited, especially if there is any warning that the inspections are coming. Call it ingenious or evil genius, but the Iraqis deliberately designed their chemical weapons programs to be inspected. It is infrastructure with a built-in ally.

Under the guise of dual-use infrastructure, Iraq has undertaken an effort to reconstitute facilities that were closely associated with its past program to develop and produce chemical weapons.

For example, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of the Tariq (ph) state establishment. Tariq (ph) includes facilities designed specifically for Iraq's chemical weapons program and employs key figures from past programs.

That's the production end of Saddam's chemical weapons business. What about the delivery end?

I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called al-Moussaid (ph), a site that Iraq has used for at least three years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field.

In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it's not just the photo, and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case.

This photograph of the site taken two months later in July shows not only the previous site, which is the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all

of the other sites around the site, have been fully bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity.

To support its deadly biological and chemical weapons programs, Iraq procures needed items from around the world using an extensive clandestine network. What we know comes largely from intercepted communications and human sources who are in a position to know the facts.

Iraq's procurement efforts include equipment that can filter and separate micro-organisms and toxins involved in biological weapons, equipment that can be used to concentrate the agent, growth media that can be used to continue producing anthrax and botulinum toxin, sterilization equipment for laboratories, glass-lined reactors and specialty pumps that can handle corrosive chemical weapons agents and precursors, large amounts of vinyl chloride, a precursor for nerve and blister agents, and other chemicals such as sodium sulfide, an important mustard agent precursor.

Now, of course, Iraq will argue that these items can also be used for legitimate purposes. But if that is true, why do we have to learn about them by intercepting communications and risking the lives of human agents? With Iraq's well documented history on biological and chemical weapons, why should any of us give Iraq the benefit of the doubt? I don't, and I don't think you will either after you hear this next intercept.

Just a few weeks ago, we intercepted communications between two commanders in Iraq's Second Republican Guard Corps. One commander is going to be giving an instruction to the other. You will hear as this unfolds that what he wants to communicate to the other guy, he wants to make sure the other guy hears clearly, to the point of repeating it so that it gets written down and completely understood. Listen.

(BEGIN AUDIO TAPE)

1/8 Speaking in Foreign Language. 3/8

(END AUDIO TAPE)

POWELL: Let's review a few selected items of this conversation. Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is misunderstood:

``Remove. Remove."

The expression, the expression, ``I got it."

"Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up."

"Got it."

"Wherever it comes up."

"In the wireless instructions, in the instructions."

"Correction. No. In the wireless instructions."

"Wireless. I got it."

Why does he repeat it that way? Why is he so forceful in making sure this is understood? And why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening.

Well, somebody was.

"Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. They are listening to us. Don't give any evidence that we have these horrible agents."

Well, we know that they do. And this kind of conversation confirms it.

Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. That is enough agent to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets. Even the low end of 100 tons of agent would enable Saddam Hussein to cause mass casualties across more than 100 square miles of territory, an area nearly 5 times the size of Manhattan.

Let me remind you that, of the 122 millimeter chemical warheads, that the U.N. inspectors found recently, this discovery could very well be, as has been noted, the tip of the submerged iceberg. The question before us, all my friends, is when will we see the rest of the submerged iceberg?

Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again, against his neighbors and against his own people.

And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them. He wouldn't be passing out the orders if he didn't have the weapons or the intent to use them.

We also have sources who tell us that, since the 1980s, Saddam's regime has been experimenting on human beings to perfect its biological or chemical weapons.

A source said that 1,600 death row prisoners were transferred in 1995 to a special unit for such experiments. An eye witness saw prisoners tied

down to beds, experiments conducted on them, blood oozing around the victim's mouths and autopsies performed to confirm the effects on the prisoners. Saddam Hussein's humanity--inhumanity has no limits.

Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program.

On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons.

To fully appreciate the challenge that we face today, remember that, in 1991, the inspectors searched Iraq's primary nuclear weapons facilities for the first time. And they found nothing to conclude that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program.

But based on defector information in May of 1991, Saddam Hussein's lie was exposed. In truth, Saddam Hussein had a massive clandestine nuclear weapons program that covered several different techniques to enrich uranium, including electromagnetic isotope separation, gas centrifuge, and gas diffusion. We estimate that this illicit program cost the Iraqis several billion dollars. Nonetheless, Iraq continued to tell the IAEA that it had no nuclear weapons program. If Saddam had not been stopped, Iraq could have produced a nuclear bomb by 1993, years earlier than most worst-case assessments that had been made before the war.

In 1995, as a result of another defector, we find out that, after his invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein had initiated a crash program to build a crude nuclear weapon in violation of Iraq's U.N. obligations.

Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise, and he has a bomb design.

Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear program have been focused on acquiring the third and last component, sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion. To make the fissile material, he needs to develop an ability to enrich uranium.

Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire high-specification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed.

These tubes are controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group precisely because they can be used as centrifuges for enriching uranium. By now, just about everyone has heard of these tubes, and we all know that there are differences of opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for.

Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in

centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher.

Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq.

I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old Army trooper, I can tell you a couple of things: First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets.

Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don't think so. Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off?

The high tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines; both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium.

In 1999 and 2000, Iraqi officials negotiated with firms in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia for the purchase of a magnet production plant. Iraq wanted the plant to produce magnets weighing 20 to 30 grams. That's the same weight as the magnets used in Iraq's gas centrifuge program before the Gulf War. This incident linked with the tubes is another indicator of Iraq's attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program.

Intercepted communications from mid-2000 through last summer show that Iraq front companies sought to buy machines that can be used to balance gas centrifuge rotors. One of these companies also had been involved in a failed effort in 2001 to smuggle aluminum tubes into Iraq.

People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind, these elicited procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material. He also has been busy trying to maintain the other key parts of his nuclear program, particularly his cadre of key nuclear scientists.

It is noteworthy that, over the last 18 months, Saddam Hussein has paid

increasing personal attention to Iraqi's top nuclear scientists, a group that the governmental-controlled press calls openly, his nuclear mujahedeen. He regularly exhorts them and praises their progress. Progress toward what end?

Long ago, the Security Council, this council, required Iraq to halt all nuclear activities of any kind. Let me talk now about the systems Iraq is developing to deliver weapons of mass destruction, in particular Iraq's ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.

First, missiles. We all remember that before the Gulf War Saddam Hussein's goal was missiles that flew not just hundreds, but thousands of kilometers. He wanted to strike not only his neighbors, but also nations far beyond his borders.

While inspectors destroyed most of the prohibited ballistic missiles, numerous intelligence reports over the past decade, from sources inside Iraq, indicate that Saddam Hussein retains a covert force of up to a few dozen Scud variant ballistic missiles. These are missiles with a range of 650 to 900 kilometers.

We know from intelligence and Iraq's own admissions that Iraq's alleged permitted ballistic missiles, the al-Samud II (ph) and the al-Fatah (ph), violate the 150-kilometer limit established by this council in Resolution 687. These are prohibited systems.

UNMOVIC has also reported that Iraq has illegally imported 380 SA-2 (ph) rocket engines. These are likely for use in the al-Samud II (ph). Their import was illegal on three counts. Resolution 687 prohibited all military shipments into Iraq. UNSCOM specifically prohibited use of these engines in surface-to-surface missiles. And finally, as we have just noted, they are for a system that exceeds the 150-kilometer range limit.

Worst of all, some of these engines were acquired as late as December--after this council passed Resolution 1441.

What I want you to know today is that Iraq has programs that are intended to produce ballistic missiles that fly of 1,000 kilometers. One program is pursuing a liquid fuel missile that would be able to fly more than 1,200 kilometers. And you can see from this map, as well as I can, who will be in danger of these missiles.

As part of this effort, another little piece of evidence, Iraq has built an engine test stand that is larger than anything it has ever had. Notice the dramatic difference in size between the test stand on the left, the old one, and the new one on the right. Note the large exhaust vent. This is where the flame from the engine comes out. The exhaust on the right test stand is five times longer than the one on the left. The one on the left was used for short-range missile. The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers.

This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand.

Saddam Hussein's intentions have never changed. He is not developing the missiles for self-defense. These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to threaten, and to deliver chemical, biological and, if we let him, nuclear warheads.

Now, unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs.

Iraq has been working on a variety of UAVs for more than a decade. This is just illustrative of what a UAV would look like. This effort has included attempts to modify for unmanned flight the MiG-21 (ph) and with greater success an aircraft called the L-29 (ph). However, Iraq is now concentrating not on these airplanes, but on developing and testing smaller UAVs, such as this.

UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that could be adapted for UAVs. And of the little that Saddam Hussein told us about UAVs, he has not told the truth. One of these lies is graphically and indisputably demonstrated by intelligence we collected on June 27, last year.

According to Iraq's December 7 declaration, its UAVs have a range of only 80 kilometers. But we detected one of Iraq's newest UAVs in a test flight that went 500 kilometers nonstop on autopilot in the race track pattern depicted here.

Not only is this test well in excess of the 150 kilometers that the United Nations permits, the test was left out of Iraq's December 7th declaration. The UAV was flown around and around and around in a circle. And so, that its 80 kilometer limit really was 500 kilometers unrefueled and on autopilot, violative of all of its obligations under 1441.

The linkages over the past 10 years between Iraq's UAV program and biological and chemical warfare agents are of deep concern to us. Iraq could use these small UAVs which have a wingspan of only a few meters to deliver biological agents to its neighbors or if transported, to other countries, including the United States.

My friends, the information I have presented to you about these terrible weapons and about Iraq's continued flaunting of its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1441 links to a subject I now want to spend a little bit of time on. And that has to do with terrorism.

Our concern is not just about these illicit weapons. It's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent

people around the world.

Iraq and terrorism go back decades. Baghdad trains Palestine Liberation Front members in small arms and explosives. Saddam uses the Arab Liberation Front to funnel money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers in order to prolong the Intifada. And it's no secret that Saddam's own intelligence service was involved in dozens of attacks or attempted assassinations in the 1990s.

But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, an associated in collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida lieutenants.

Zarqawi, a Palestinian born in Jordan, fought in the Afghan war more than a decade ago. Returning to Afghanistan in 2000, he oversaw a terrorist training camp. One of his specialities and one of the specialties of this camp is poisons. When our coalition ousted the Taliban, the Zarqawi network helped establish another poison and explosive training center camp. And this camp is located in northeastern Iraq.

You see a picture of this camp. The network is teaching its operatives how to produce ricin and other poisons. Let me remind you how ricin works. Less than a pinch--image a pinch of salt--less than a pinch of ricin, eating just this amount in your food, would cause shock followed by circulatory failure. Death comes within 72 hours and there is no antidote, there is no cure. It is fatal.

Those helping to run this camp are Zarqawi lieutenants operating in northern Kurdish areas outside Saddam Hussein's controlled Iraq. But Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar al-Islam, that controls this corner of Iraq. In 2000 this agent offered Al Qaida safe haven in the region. After we swept Al Qaida from Afghanistan, some of its members accepted this safe haven. They remain there today.

Zarqawi's activities are not confined to this small corner of north east Iraq. He traveled to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment, staying in the capital of Iraq for two months while he recuperated to fight another day.

During this stay, nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there. These Al Qaida affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they've now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months.

Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with Al Qaida. These denials are

simply not credible. Last year an Al Qaida associate bragged that the situation in Iraq was, quote, ``good," that Baghdad could be transited quickly.

We know these affiliates are connected to Zarqawi because they remain even today in regular contact with his direct subordinates, including the poison cell plotters, and they are involved in moving more than money and materiale.

Last year, two suspected Al Qaida operatives were arrested crossing from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. They were linked to associates of the Baghdad cell, and one of them received training in Afghanistan on how to use cyanide. From his terrorist network in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct his network in the Middle East and beyond.

We, in the United States, all of us at the State Department, and the Agency for International Development--we all lost a dear friend with the cold-blooded murder of Mr. Lawrence Foley in Amman, Jordan last October, a despicable act was committed that day. The assassination of an individual whose sole mission was to assist the people of Jordan. The captured assassin says his cell received money and weapons from Zarqawi for that murder. After the attack, an associate of the assassin left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations. Iraqi officials protest that they are not aware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or of any of his associates. Again, these protests are not credible. We know of Zarqawi's activities in Baghdad. I described them earlier.

And now let me add one other fact. We asked a friendly security service to approach Baghdad about extraditing Zarqawi and providing information about him and his close associates. This service contacted Iraqi officials twice, and we passed details that should have made it easy to find Zarqawi. The network remains in Baghdad. Zarqawi still remains at large to come and go.

As my colleagues around this table and as the citizens they represent in Europe know, Zarqawi's terrorism is not confined to the Middle East. Zarqawi and his network have plotted terrorist actions against countries, including France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia.

According to detainee Abuwatia (ph), who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, tasks at least nine North African extremists from 2001 to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.

Since last year, members of this network have been apprehended in France, Britain, Spain and Italy. By our last count, 116 operatives connected to this global web have been arrested.

The chart you are seeing shows the network in Europe. We know about

this European network, and we know about its links to Zarqawi, because the detainee who provided the information about the targets also provided the names of members of the network.

Three of those he identified by name were arrested in France last December. In the apartments of the terrorists, authorities found circuits for explosive devices and a list of ingredients to make toxins.

The detainee who helped piece this together says the plot also targeted Britain. Later evidence, again, proved him right. When the British unearthed a cell there just last month, one British police officer was murdered during the disruption of the cell.

We also know that Zarqawi's colleagues have been active in the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia and in Chechnya, Russia. The plotting to which they are linked is not mere chatter. Members of Zarqawi's network say their goal was to kill Russians with toxins.

We are not surprised that Iraq is harboring Zarqawi and his subordinates. This understanding builds on decades long experience with respect to ties between Iraq and Al Qaida. Going back to the early and mid-1990s, when bin Laden was based in Sudan, an Al Qaida source tells us that Saddam and bin Laden reached an understanding that Al Qaida would no longer support activities against Baghdad. Early Al Qaida ties were forged by secret, high-level intelligence service contacts with Al Qaida, secret Iraqi intelligence high-level contacts with Al Qaida.

We know members of both organizations met repeatedly and have met at least eight times at very senior levels since the early 1990s. In 1996, a foreign security service tells us, that bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence official in Khartoum, and later met the director of the Iraqi intelligence service.

Saddam became more interested as he saw Al Qaida's appalling attacks. A detained Al Qaida member tells us that Saddam was more willing to assist Al Qaida after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Saddam was also impressed by Al Qaida's attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000.

Iraqis continued to visit bin Laden in his new home in Afghanistan. A senior defector, one of Saddam's former intelligence chiefs in Europe, says Saddam sent his agents to Afghanistan sometime in the mid-1990s to provide training to Al Qaida members on document forgery.

From the late 1990s until 2001, the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan played the role of liaison to the Al Qaida organization.

Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and Al Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are

enough to bring Iraq and Al Qaida together, enough so Al Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that Al Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.

And the record of Saddam Hussein's cooperation with other Islamist terrorist organizations is clear. Hamas, for example, opened an office in Baghdad in 1999, and Iraq has hosted conferences attended by Palestine Islamic Jihad. These groups are at the forefront of sponsoring suicide attacks against Israel.

Al Qaida continues to have a deep interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. As with the story of Zarqawi and his network, I can trace the story of a senior terrorist operative telling how Iraq provided training in these weapons to Al Qaida.

Fortunately, this operative is now detained, and he has told his story. I will relate it to you now as he, himself, described it.

This senior Al Qaida terrorist was responsible for one of Al Qaida's training camps in Afghanistan. His information comes first-hand from his personal involvement at senior levels of Al Qaida. He says bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased Al Qaida leader Muhammad Atif (ph), did not believe that Al Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help. Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq.

The support that (inaudible) describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two Al Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abu Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdula Al-Iraqi (ph) characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.

As I said at the outset, none of this should come as a surprise to any of us. Terrorism has been a tool used by Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name. And this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.

With this track record, Iraqi denials of supporting terrorism take the place alongside the other Iraqi denials of weapons of mass destruction. It is all a web of lies.

When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past, we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even

more frightening future.

My friends, this has been a long and a detailed presentation. And I thank you for your patience. But there is one more subject that I would like to touch on briefly. And it should be a subject of deep and continuing concern to this council, Saddam Hussein's violations of human rights.

Underlying all that I have said, underlying all the facts and the patterns of behavior that I have identified as Saddam Hussein's contempt for the will of this council, his contempt for the truth and most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life. Saddam Hussein's use of mustard and nerve gas against the Kurds in 1988 was one of the 20th century's most horrible atrocities; 5,000 men, women and children died. His campaign against the Kurds from 1987 to '89 included mass summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary jailing, ethnic cleansing and the destruction of some 2,000 villages. He has also conducted ethnic cleansing against the Shi'a Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs whose culture has flourished for more than a millennium. Saddam Hussein's police state ruthlessly eliminates anyone who dares to dissent. Iraq has more forced disappearance cases than any other country, tens of thousands of people reported missing in the past decade.

Nothing points more clearly to Saddam Hussein's dangerous intentions and the threat he poses to all of us than his calculated cruelty to his own citizens and to his neighbors. Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him.

For more than 20 years, by word and by deed Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows, intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world's most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he most hold to fulfill his ambition.

We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?

The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.

My colleagues, over three months ago this council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that

Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of this council.

My colleagues, we have an obligation to our citizens, we have an obligation to this body to see that our resolutions are complied with. We wrote 1441 not in order to go to war, we wrote 1441 to try to preserve the peace. We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not so far taking that one last chance.

We must not shrink from whatever is ahead of us. We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of the countries that are represented by this body.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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